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Abstract
In the wake of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, former rebel leader turned President
Paul Kagame set about restructuring the shattered state on a foundation of
gender equality policies, arguing gender mainstreaming was crucial to
national reconstruction. These policies have been acclaimed internationally
and domestically. The existence of impressive gender equality legislation is
extremely good politics for a state dependent on foreign aid, and Kagame’s has
skillfully leveraged international genocide guilt following the global
abandonment of any responsibility to intervene and stop the killing. The
political strategy of gender mainstreaming has delivered Kagame and his
government an international reputation as a progressive gender equal society.
Gender quotas have cemented Rwanda’s place as world leader in the number
and proportion of female parliamentarians, and this achievement is backed by
an array of pro-women legislation. There is however a disjuncture between
the myth of Rwanda as a gender equal society, and the reality.
Using primarily secondary sources, this thesis argues that Rwanda’s
internationally lauded gender quotas and legislation have not delivered
fundamental rights for Rwandan women and girls in terms of freedom from
gender-based violence, access to abortion and sexual and reproductive health.
In fact, the Rwandan government and judiciary have actively suppressed
women’s sexual health rights. The denial of these fundamental freedoms
constitutes an abuse of human rights. The thesis explores the underlying
political, cultural, and religious reasons for this ongoing suppression. In its
explanation of gender-based violence, abortion, and sexual and reproductive
health, this thesis explores the reality of the supposed Rwandan gender
equality for Rwandan women and girls, arguing that gender equality as
articulated by the Kagame government is a myth.
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Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review
This thesis is an examination of the reality of gender equality in Rwanda. It
focuses on the supposed ‘mainstreaming’ of gender in Rwanda, a process by
which women and men participate in all aspects of social, political and
economic life. Rwanda has crafted something of a reputation for itself as a
progressive gender equal society through gender quotas and pro-women
legislation, and this thesis explores gender mainstreaming through an
examination of gender-based violence, access to abortion and access to sexual
and reproductive health care. The thesis argues that the fundamental rights
that exist for women at law with respect to these issues are not in fact the
reality for Rwandan women and girls.
This chapter first relates my interest in Rwanda and this topic before briefly
traversing Rwanda’s political history, both pre and post genocide, with a focus
on the rule of Paul Kagame since the genocide and its emphasis on gender.
Through an examination of the literature, the thesis identifies the contested
issue nature of interpretation of the role of gender in Rwandan society and the
genocide, setting the scene for a specific examination of gender-based
violence, access to abortion and access to sexual and reproductive health care
in subsequent chapters.

Historical context
In January 2021 it is over 26 years since one of the most catastrophic
genocides of the twentieth century. These mass killings were the culmination
of decades of sporadic conflict between the majority Hutus and minority
Tutsis, much of which occurred due to the policies of the Belgian state and its
indirect colonial rule. Under the 1884 Berlin Conference, the states now
known as Rwanda and Burundi were placed under German control, however
during the First World War Belgian occupied parts of Germany’s East African
territory from 1916, and its status as governing authority was confirmed
through the League of Nations as a “B” class Mandate (the “Belgian Mandate
1

for East Africa, Ruanda-Urundi”) under which Belgium was act as governing
power ensuring that its people had “freedom of conscience and religion."
After the Second World War the Mandate was converted into the United
Nations Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, and Belgian rule maintained the
minority Tutsi as the governing elite. Belgium attempted to manage its African
decolonization process, but in Rwanda it was not particularly successful. In
November 1959 Hutu interests launched a revolt, the Rwandan Revolution,
which ushered in a two-year period of political and social transition. In
response Belgium organized communal elections in Rwanda for June of 1960,
in which Hutu-dominated parties secured over 83% of the vote. Hutu leader
Gregoire Kayibanda declared Rwanda independent in September 1961 with
Dominique Mbonyumutwa as Interim President, and at full independence in
July of 1962 Gregoire Kayibanda became Rwanda’s first President. He ruled
until 1973 (Eriksson 1996: 21-41).
During the initial years of independence ethnic-based conflict erupted
sporadically with an estimated 10,000 Tutsis killed, while thousands more
sought refuge in neighbouring countries, mainly Uganda. In a military coup
d’état on 5 July 1973 Juvenal Habyarimana deposed Kayibanda , promoting a
platform of ending corruption and ethnic conflict. Habyarimana was re-elected
in 1983 with 99.98% of the vote (African Elections Database, 2011). There was
however, increasing international pressure to allow Rwandan Tutsi exiles to
return home. In an effort to reduce tension, in July 1990 President
Habyarimana conceded to a power sharing agreement with the Tutsi-in-exile
army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Three months later, Paul Kagame
and the RPF invaded Rwanda from the north, igniting a four-year civil war
(Melvern, 2020: 218-221; Jessee, 2017: 8-11). Three years into the civil war,
in August 1993, a peace deal in the form of the Arusha Accords was signed
between the Habyarimana government and the RPF. The UN Security Council
authorized the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was
formed to oversee the implementation of the Accords.
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The signing of the Accords did not signal a halt in the conflict. The extreme
faction of Habyarimana’s party, Hutu Power, stockpiled weapons, broadcast
racist and sexist anti Tutsi propaganda on Radio Milles Collines (RTLM) and
published racist and sexist anti Tutsi propaganda in articles and cartoons in
the magazine Kangura (Wake Up), exhorting Hutus to destroy Tutsis or as they
described them, the inyenzi (cockroaches).
The death of President Habyarimana in a missile attack on his plane as it
prepared to land at Kigali airport, on April 6, 1994, triggered the Rwandan
genocide. The Rwandan government army erected roadblocks around Kigali
almost immediately and the murder, torture, and mutilation of between
500,000 and 800,000 mainly Tutsis took place over the next hundred days.
Murders took place at roadblocks, in villages and at private homes, while
thousands more were slaughtered in Catholic Churches where they had taken
refuge. Many people were murdered by the government-armed and trained
civilian militia the Interahamwe. There were also instances of complicity by
some priests and nuns in some of these church killings. Machetes and guns
were the main implements used to kill, mutilate, and torture the civilian
population, but rape was also a genocidal weapon, with Tutsi women targeted
and punished with multiple rapes, torture, mutilation and death (Human
Rights Watch, 1996: 12). The Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion ended the
genocide on 18 July 1994 and drove nearly 2 million Hutus, among them
genocidaires, across the border into Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) (Melvern, 2020: 221; Jessee, 2017: 11).

Motivations
In July 1994 I was a journalist with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation
(ABC). I went to Rwanda and recorded and produced two radio documentaries
‘No Devils in Hell’ – Parts 1 & 2, for Radio National. I encountered these grim
hostile refugee camps in Goma in the production of No Devils in Hell, I covered
what was really the final stages of the Rwandan genocide (July/August 1994),
by which time most of the killing was done. During my time in Rwanda I
hitched rides across the country, interviewing Hutus and Tutsis, victims,
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families of victims, survivors, medicos, members of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), Major Rose Kabuye, who was to later run Kigali, and the military
commander of the RPF, Paul Kagame, who in 1994 became Minister of Defence
and Vice President. In 2000 he became Rwanda’s President and at the time of
writing has enjoyed 20 years in power, having won elections in 2003, 2010
and 2017.
I visited sites of mass killings. Inside one small Catholic Church at Ntarama,
there were so many bodies and remains of bodies, it was almost impossible to
step between them. The mummified remains of bodies, still clothed, littered
the grounds outside the church. I stood with Enrico Fontini, an Italian
paediatrician, outside the church on a July day in a still, very quiet rural setting.
His job was taking care of Rwandan orphans whose parents had been
murdered. We were reduced to silence. The documentaries I made for the ABC
were an attempt to understand the genocide and its aftermath, as much for me
as a journalist, as for an Australian audience.
There were 1400 orphaned and displaced children at the orphanage run by
Fontini. Initially it was just a matter of keeping them alive. They had witnessed
the shooting, hacking, and clubbing to death of parents and families, by Hutus,
some of them former neighbours. In speaking with the children, who were
mostly between the ages of six and nine, Enrico said they didn’t want revenge,
but felt the killers should be in prison, but if there were not enough people to
build the prison, one child said, ‘they could at least bring them to me, so they
can look at me and apologise and cry’ (No Devils in Hell, 1994: Part Two).
I caught a taxi from Kigali and crossed the border to Goma in Zaire into a vast
Hutu refugee camp. Identifying militia was not difficult as there were so many
soldiers in uniform. They were still armed with sub machine guns, grenades,
pangas and tonnes of ammunition. These men ran this grim, grey, bleak camp
like thugs:
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Rwanda is empty, it’s empty, it’s an empty country. No Hutu can go there. People
were being cut like cows, they could cut somebody with their knife, cut his neck
and then cut from the neck downward, and take off the stomach, disembowel.
That’s what we feared and we all run away. They were RPF. They were killing
everybody they met. (Unidentified Hutu female and unidentified Hutu male in
the Mugunga camp, Zaire, 1994. No Devils in Hell. Part One).

A million and a half Hutus like these still crowded Rwanda’s borders. In just
over a week up to a fifth of Rwanda’s population had left the country. Many of
whom had taken part in the slaughter of up to 800,000 Tutsis. They were
fleeing across Rwanda’s borders before the advance of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front and were concerned for their own safety:
RPF is doing propaganda, and asking people to go back to Rwanda, but I think they
will fail, because you know they are killers. I can’t go back. (Unidentified Hutu male
in Mugunga camp, Zaire 1994: No Devils in Hell. Part One).
Both sides are now constructing very different histories of the war and its origins.
(Jeune Pritchard, 1994: No Devils in Hell. Part One).

I returned to Rwanda in May 2016, once I had retired from journalism and this
time my interest was the lived reality of Rwandan women and girls within the
context of much touted gender equality policies legislated by Paul Kagame and
his RPF government, post genocide.

The Rape Victims of the Genocide
One of the most disturbing features of the Rwandan genocide is the use of rape
and sexual violence. Gender played a critical role in planning and the lived
experience of the 1994 genocide with rape and sexual torture being key
elements of the tactics of the Hutu Power extremists. The sexual violence
against Tutsi women was fueled by ethnic and gender stereotypes with the
women being portrayed in the Hutu propaganda as ‘seductress-spies’,
‘beautiful and sexy’, inaccessible and far too good for Hutu men. Therefore
rape, sexual torture and mutilation were used to degrade, humiliate and
ultimately destroy them (Human Rights Watch, 1996: 11-13). Rape survivors
recounted to Human Rights Watch, who authored Shattered Lives, that their
rapists always mentioned their ethnicity with comments like “you Tutsi
women think you’re too good for us”, and “we want to see if a Tutsi woman is
like a Hutu woman”, and “if there was peace you wouldn’t accept me”.
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Testimonies from rape survivors indicate that rape was the rule and its
absence the exception; some observers believe that almost every woman and
girl who survived the genocide was raped (Shattered Lives, 1996: 16). The
ages of women and girls raped ranged from as young as two to over 50. A
survey of over 300 rape survivors by Rwanda’s Ministry of Gender and Family
Promotion (MIGEPROF) and the United Nations International Children’s’
Emergency fund (UNICEF) found the average age of rape survivors to be about
24. Mutilation of sexual organs was often part of the rape or followed it. There
was also mutilation of features supposedly characteristic of Tutsi women and
girls, like noses and hands. Other mutilations included pouring boiling water
into a woman’s vagina, slashing open the womb of a pregnant woman before
killing her, cutting off breasts and slashing the pelvic area (Shattered Lives,
1996: 36).
The Kangura magazine, an instrument of racist and sexist vilification against
Tutsis, published ‘Ten Commandments of the Hutu’ at the beginning of the civil
war in 1990, some of which exhorted Hutu women to be vigilant of behalf of
their husbands and sons against the sexual allure of Tutsi women.
Commandment 7 stipulated “The Rwandan armed forces must be exclusively
Hutu. The experience of October 1990 has taught us a lesson. No soldier should
marry a Tutsi woman” (Avega AGAHOZA, 1999: 12).
The devastation of being one of an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 women
targeted in this genocidal strategy, is exemplified by Bernadette, one of the
rape survivors interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 1996 for the Shattered
Lives report. She lived in a commune near Gitarama with her husband and
seven children. The interahamwe killed all the men and boys in the commune
and she was left with her baby and three girls. She recounted that:
I was raped by a group of six Interahamwe. I knew them all… After they had
finished raping me they threw me into the river to die along with my children.
My children all drowned, but the river threw me back. I floated to the riverside
(Shattered Lives, 1996: 24).

Such stories were all too common at the time, and I heard many stories of
appalling sexualized violence when in Rwanda. This thesis has evolved out of
6

an interest in understanding how Rwanda has confronted its brutal history of
genocide, and in particular the social and political rights of women before and
after the genocide.

Competing Post Genocide Narratives
The history of those events continues to be rewritten. Competing and
confronting narratives exist that purport to deliver historical truths about
Rwanda — pre-genocide, during the genocide and in the aftermath. The most
recent, and the most diametrically opposed, range from the book by journalist
Judi Rever (2018) on the crimes of the RPF, through to the work of journalist
Linda Melvern (2020) who confronts the denial of the Tutsi genocide. Other
narratives hark back to an idealized pre-colonial past in which they claim there
were no ethnic or racial tensions prior to the Belgian rule (Jessee, 2020: 237238; Longman, 2017: 59). There are different recollections of pre-colonial
Rwanda by some Hutus and Hutu genocidaires. The most common Hutu
narrative is one of oppression by the Tutsi monarchy (Jessee, 2020: 238).
However, a unified past with no ethnic division has become part of the
officially sanctioned history of the current government led by Paul Kagame.
According to Jessee’s research this narrative is accepted only by a minority of
the population as an accurate record, but it is critical to maintaining stability
and delivering a single uncomplicated political history (Jessee, 2020: 237).
Longman (2017: 82-83) and Thomson (2018: 84) are in accord with Jessee’s
conclusions. This ‘single story’ could bode ill for the current Kagame regime as
it appears to repeat the mistakes of the previous regimes of Kayibanda and
Habyarimana. This narrative has all the hallmarks of an authoritarian regime,
and arguably could threaten Rwanda’s long term political stability (Jessee,
2020: 238).
One of the ongoing political tensions among the majority Hutu population is,
what they describe as the failure of the RPF government to acknowledge any
targeted killings of Hutus during the genocide. The extreme version of this
narrative is the theory of the ‘double genocide’, that is, that Hutus were also
victims of a genocide conducted by Tutsis. This version of history is
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promulgated by some academics, journalists (Rever, 2018) and some
members of the Hutu diaspora.

The Single Story
It is within the context of these conflicting narratives that Paul Kagame and the
RPF government set about restructuring Rwanda, politically, economically and
culturally. Under the leadership of Kagame, the RPF ended the genocide.
Kagame then used his total political power to re-engineer the shattered state,
although as an authoritarian regime that tolerates no political opposition or
freedom of the press.
Within these boundaries, Paul Kagame made the political calculation to make
gender equality foundational to economic growth, cultural change and
political stability. The government legislated to make the country the most
gender equal state, globally. Gender ‘mainstreaming’ became policy in a state
where gender norms had always been strongly patriarchal.
Rwanda has the highest percentage of women in national parliament, and
portrays itself as a leader in gender issues, however as I argue in this thesis,
the myth and the reality do not coincide. The focus on issues of gender-based
violence, access to abortion and sexual and reproductive health demonstrate
that the official rhetoric glosses over the lived reality for Rwandan women and
girls who remain subjects of patriarchal social relations and experience
unequal gender treatment.

Traditional Gender Norms
Legislating for gender equality in a patriarchal state after a genocide was a
monumental cultural and political restructure. To place this in context, it is
necessary to first chart the evolution of traditional gender norms. Rwanda was
split strictly along patriarchal lines — women bore as many children as
possible, took care of the family and produced the food. Men ruled the
household and were to be respected by all members of the family. Women
could not own land: property legally went to the male heir or heirs, or to a
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man’s brothers upon his death (Uwineza and Pearson, 2009: 8-11). In this
rural based economy, women did 65-70% of the agricultural work, but they
had no right to control or inherit resources (Brown, 2016: 243-244). A woman
also had no claims over property if there were no offspring, if her husband had
died or if she had divorced. Additionally, if a woman had borne children and
her husband had died, it was a cultural law that she would marry a brother of
her husband (Brown, 2016: 244). Women were silenced in the private and
public spheres. Feminist scholar Sara E Brown (2016: 244) notes “whatever
men could do, a woman should and must obey”. There is a saying in Rwanda
that there are no mistakes for men: “Even beating a woman, even wasting
money, even doing whatever he wants, there is no mistake for a man”
(Uwineza & Pearson, 2009: 15). Women did not speak publicly in the presence
of men and they certainly did not challenge, confront or criticize them.
Polygamy was a widely accepted practice, although it existed mostly among
the wealthy. A woman was considered to belong not only to the male head of
the household, but also to his extended family, and she might be encouraged
to have sexual relationships with her husband’s brothers (Uwineza & Pearson,
2009: 10). Marriage delivered a woman into the ownership of her husband.
Oral historian Erin Jessee takes issue with the above scholarship that
emphasizes the patriarchal nature of gender norms, ‘seemingly since time
immemorial’ (Jessee, 2020: 225). Her critique is that this consensus was
reached by an examination of gender norms only since independence in 1962.
She agrees that this research accurately reflects the effect on contemporary
gender norms, but takes no account of the role of women in early Rwandan
history. Uwineza and Pearson (2009: 16-17) disagree and contend that roles
were still deeply gendered in pre-colonial Rwanda. There was a distinct split
between respecting women as mothers and domestic workers, but
subjugation through the traditional practice of polygamy, an expected deferral
to men in decision-making and a distinct female absence from public
engagement. Pre-genocide little had changed.
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Brown is in accord with Uwineza and Pearson, arguing that Rwandan culture
was one that demanded female obedience and subordination to men and
reflected a long-standing “deeply entrenched patriarchal system” (Brown,
2016: 233). Jessee’s scholarship draws on oral tradition as interpreted by
scholars and missionaries from the colonial period. She contends that women
exerted agency beyond a subordinate role and she argues this through the lens
of family planning and gender norms. However her evidence seems directly
related to a woman’s social status, class and ethnicity (Jessee, 2020: 255). A
favoured Tutsi wife in a polygamous marriage could be judged to wield greater
power than a poor rural woman, although both roles would still be deeply
gendered. In pre-colonial times, as well as during the colonial period and
during the period of independent rule immense value was placed on having as
many children as possible, but this was strictly the preserve of married
couples. Single pregnant women and girls were regarded as the guilty party
and they were ostracized, and at times abandoned to a solitary fate beyond the
bounds of the village (Jessee, 2020: 227).

Deeper Divisions
Religion and the nationwide conversion to Catholicism following the decline
of the Tutsi monarchy in the early 1930s was a key factor in further containing
and constraining women’s roles culturally and politically (Jessee, 2020: 229).
She also draws on research that aligns conversion to Catholicism with the
adoption of European values that in turn led to the increasing rigidity of
gender roles. However most scholarship indicates that the traditional roles of
women within a patriarchal system as wives and mothers was the established
norm from the pre- colonial period. As indicated earlier, class and ethnicity
cannot be dismissed as factors in the shaping of gender roles. Wealthier
women were able to exercise a greater degree of control over their domestic
domains, although ceding, by tradition, overall control to their husbands.
Based on class, both pre genocide and under Belgian rule, Tutsi women were
exempted from rural labor. There is some further pushback against the
research on traditional gender norms in Rwandan society. H A Alahira takes
issue with a ‘Eurocentric’ approach to female roles and advocates a more
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African socio-cultural perspective, balking against “the universal theory of the
origin of sexual oppression” that has “led to the erroneous conclusion that all
women should come together in order to fight and abolish universal sexual
oppression of women” (Alahira, 2014: 76-78). The argument develops that the
result of adopting a purely Eurocentric position will not be gender equality,
but a female elite whose goals and values set them apart from all other women
and men (Alahira, 2014: 85).

The ICTR and Sexual Violence
With rape and sexual violence being the norm for possibly every woman who
survived the genocide, how can Rwandan women achieve justice? A variety of
post-conflict mechanisms have been devised to deal with perpetrators of the
Rwandan genocide, both international and national, however the experiences
of women have not always been the focus of achieving justice.
Following the genocide, the United Nations Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), with the first trial opening
in 1997. The function of the tribunal was to identify and prosecute
perpetrators for all acts of genocide. For the first time, rape was identified in
international law, as an act of genocide. This was a dramatic change in
international law, but it is critical to frame the cultural context of these
hearings and the challenges confronting rape victims and the reluctance of
many to give evidence. Many were daunted by cultural and judicial obstacles
to pursuing complaints and had to overcome feelings of shame, community
rejection, being stigmatized as rape victims, all responses that had existed
before the genocide. These crippling responses were compounded by the fact
that some women and girls had contracted HIV/AIDS as a result of rape. It was
within this traditional cultural framework that the ICTR hearings were held
(Human Rights Watch, 2004: 5).
The ICTR did, however, convict a former mayor, Jean-Paul Akayesu, on nine
counts of rape and sexual assault in that he “ordered, instigated and abetted
the multiple acts of rape of ten girls and women by numerous militia

11

members… sending a clear signal of official tolerance for sexual violence”
(UNDPKO, 2009: 50). Akayesu was given a life sentence. The ICTR found that
“Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically
targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and
to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole” (UN International Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: 7.1-7.9). Three media executives—two of
whom were the founders of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM),
the other the editor of Kangura—were found guilty for their role in instigating
hatred and inciting genocide. Binaifer Nowrogee, Harvard lawyer and author
of the Shattered Lives report, was very critical of the ICTR, for not charging
these men with sexual crimes against Tutsi women (2007: 362). In fact, the
three men were found to have “targeted, vilified and endangered” Tutsi
women which could have led to rape and mutilation, but they were not
charged with sexual violence. Nowrogee argued that this was a downplaying
of the very significant role that sexual violence had played in the genocidal
strategies of the perpetrators, as seen through RTLM broadcasts, the content
of the Kangura newspaper and rallies and meetings of the Hutu faithful. Seven
years into the ICTR hearings, 90% of completed cases had no convictions for
sexual violence and in 70% of these cases the prosecution had brought no
sexual violence charges, despite widespread and graphic evidence. Of the 30%
that included charges of rape, 10% were found guilty of their role in sexual
violence. Nowrogee found that this record represented a failure of political will
and a ‘squandered opportunity’ (2007: 370). She questions these outcomes
against the evidence that tens of thousands of rapes were committed during
the genocide (Nowrogee, 2007: 369).
Thousands of women and girls were individually raped, gang-raped, raped with
objects such as sharpened sticks or gun barrels, held in sexual slavery either
collectively or through forced marriage, and sexually mutilated (ICTR Prosecution
of Sexual Violence, para 4). During one trial where the rape was defined as torture,
the accused denied any knowledge of rape, explaining to the court that, “in Rwandan
tradition or culture, rape has never existed” (ICTR para 4).

This statement from a perpetrator is a chilling indication of how sexual
violence was regarded in Rwanda, pre genocide and post genocide.
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Gacaca Courts and Sexual Violence
Thousands of those accused of genocide were incarcerated in overflowing jails,
so to cope with an overwhelmed domestic judicial system the government
reinstituted the traditional gacaca community courts in 2005.1 Within these
courts, locally elected judges would hear all crimes, except where suspects
were accused of planning the genocide. There were relatively few reports of
rape and sexual violence, despite there being tens of thousands of victims
(Human Rights Watch, 2011). The early gacaca law in 2001 proved a major
impediment to women testifying, as victims were required to give written or
oral testimony before a hearing of a minimum of a hundred community
members. A written testimony had to be read to the community, and given the
stigma attached to victims of sexual violence it is hardly surprising that few
women were prepared to testify. The other option open to a complainant was
that she could testify in camera before nineteen gacaca judges, and the
accused. Changes to the law in 2004 allowed the complainant to testify before
a single judge, but she was still afforded little protection. Human Rights Watch,
2004 found that many of the rape victims interviewed wanted to testify and
hold the perpetrators accountable, but were daunted by cultural obstacles.
There were no evidentiary rules in gacaca hearings, such as physical proof of
rape, but this also allowed for the easy denial of sexual violence. Eyewitness
accounts were hard to substantiate as many women and girls were raped
following the killing of their families (Shattered Lives, 1996). The Rwandan
penal code of 1977 prohibited defilement, rape, torture and sexual torture but
failed to define these acts, so it was hardly surprising that the gacaca courts
had difficulty recognizing and proving these charges.
The transfer of more than 8,000 cases of rape or sexual violence to the gacaca
courts from the National Courts was opposed by women’s groups such as
Association des Veuves du Genocide Agahozo (Association of Genocide Widows)
(AVEGA), the umbrella women’s organization Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe, and
the Rwandan Association of Trauma Counselors, as well as the victims of

The word gacaca in Kinyarwanda has been translated as “short grass”, denoting the open
spaces in villages on which Rwandan men would meet to decide issues.
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sexual violence. These women had been reluctant to come forward, and had
only done so having been assured their evidence would be heard before a
conventional court, not a gacaca court. Their reluctance stemmed from a fear
that their evidence would not remain confidential, because the gacaca judges
were all from their own community and could possibly be related to the
accused (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Corruption of judges was an issue for
some, who believed that being heard in a more conventional court would mean
less chance for the accused to corrupt the judge (Human Rights Watch, 2011).
Given the difficulty and reluctance in coming forward, some women felt that
rape was being minimized if heard before a gacaca court. Others felt that
sentences were too lenient, especially if the perpetrator confessed. The most
manifest examples of victim shaming were the women who did not pursue
complaints because they had not told spouses or families of the rape and did
not want to create problems within their community.
The gacaca system processed more accused than the ICTR, transnational trials
and regular Rwandan courts combined, although research by Max Rettig held
that the gacaca court system was fundamentally flawed and suggested that the
process made little contribution to reconciliation, and possibly fueled ongoing
conflict, resentment, and ethnic disunity (Rettig, 2013: 29-31). Amnesty
International questioned the ability of gacaca judges with minimal legal or
human rights expertise to ‘withstand the political pressure to impose
retributive sentences’ (Amnesty International, 2002). Alison des Forges,
author of Leave None to Tell the Story (1999), and witness for the prosecution
at the ICTR, was also a critic of gacaca justice. Des Forges found that gacaca
justice was unfair to perpetrators as well as victims, and represented a ‘victor’s
justice’ enforced by a Tutsi-dominated state.

Post Genocide Progress on Gender Equality
After the RPF victory in the civil war, Paul Kagame used his political authority
and intellect to restructure the Rwandan state in a manner that harnessed the
gender imbalance—which was now 70 % female 30% male—to make Rwanda
more inclusive of women. The proposed transformation was built into a
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government statement known as Rwanda Vision 2020. Vision 2020 provided a
“road map and justification” for gender equality policy and legislation (Brown,
2016: 242), which formed the basis for the six foundational pillars of the new
Rwanda: good governance, human resource development, the building of a
private sector, infrastructure, market-based agriculture and regional and
international integration. Written in 2000 and based on these six pillars, the
statement aimed to convert Rwanda from an agrarian economy to one that was
knowledge-based.
Gender was a foundational and cross cutting issue, expressed in these terms:
In order to achieve gender equality and equity, Rwanda will continuously update
and adapt its laws on gender. It will support education for all, eradicate all forms
of discrimination, fight against poverty and practice a positive discrimination
policy in favor of women (cited in Brown, 2016: 242).

Built on this foundation, Rwanda was a very attractive proposition to
international aid donors as it represented a progressive restructure and
crucially, political stability. Kagame deserves huge credit for the impressive
statistics in lifting nearly one million people out of poverty between 2005 and
2010, the dramatic increase in life expectancy, the high proportion of female
politicians and civil servants, the drop in infant mortality, the rise in adult
literacy, and by world standards, a low ranking in state corruption, as assessed
by Transparency International (Longman, 2017:265-270).
In her research on the reshaping of gender norms post genocide, Sara E. Brown
is positive about the gains made by women under the RPF government, and
she contends that it provides significant space for women to be influential in
civil society and politics (Brown, 2016: 240). She does acknowledge however,
that in the early years post genocide, the women’s committees in every level
of government existed in the same subordinate capacity as they had pre
genocide (Brown, 2016: 241). On imposing gender equality from the top down,
Brown’s explanation is that the RPF returnees who gained political power post
genocide were better positioned than their Rwandan counterparts as they
were more ‘international’, having lived outside of Rwanda as refugees and
having gained better education in the United States and Europe. The argument
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followed that their perceptions of gender equality were more progressive than
traditional Rwandan norms and that therefore the RPF returnees were better
equipped to implement gender equality policy (Brown, 2016: 242).
David Mwambari likewise, adopts a fairly positive assessment of transitional
changes in gender norms post genocide. His contention is that the
proportionally high female population has altered the traditional Rwandan
perception of labour, gender roles, generational responsibilities and power.
His focus was on the flourishing of women based non-government
organisations (NGOs) post genocide, although he does however acknowledge
that their existence and sustainability is dependent on their approval by the
RPF. Mwambari also acknowledges that even with a transitional shift in gender
roles, the major obstacles for Rwandan women are patriarchal norms that
inhabit all aspects of the culture (Mwambari, 2017: 67-71). A more pragmatic
position is taken by Golooba-Mutebi in addressing the Rwandan aversion to
political dissent. In his analysis, post genocide Rwanda has to be understood
in the context of consensus building, and economic, social and political
stability. His is a very positive endorsement of Kagame and his authoritarian
rule, with the belief that adversarial political contests end in conflict (GoloobaMutebi, 2013).
Scholarship countering these more positive responses by Brown and
Mwambari include work by Debusscher and Ansoms who found through their
interviews that little had changed for rural women, although the urban elite
had thrived. They found that the transformative potential of gender equality
was limited, and sometimes ignored if it conflicted with goals of economic
growth and modernization (Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013: 1111-1134).
Marie Berry interviewed women across class, profession and the urban rural
divide and found that there were profound impediments to gender equality
that were unlikely to dissipate soon. In spite of the women friendly policies in
relation to land ownership, health and education and gender-based violence,
it was hard to shift attitudes within families. Elite, urban, educated Tutsi
women were the beneficiaries, but not the majority of Rwandan women.
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Paradoxes still exist between development and poverty, stability and
oppression, female empowerment and traditional female roles. Single women
were denied the same rights as married women, a discrimination that
continues currently in terms of access to sexual and reproductive health care
and abortion (Berry, 2015). Onditi and Odera examined the impact of gender
equality on female empowerment as outlined in the millennium development
goals (MDGs) and sustainable development goals (SDGs). Across African states
there was consensus that gender equality legislation would lead to
empowering women, but the outcome of the MDGs has fallen short of that goal.
The analysis by Onditi and Odera is that a strong human rights framework is
fundamental to women’s empowerment, no matter what gender equality
legislation was in place (2017: pp. 155-156).

Female Political Representation in post-genocide Rwanda
The most spectacular exemplar of the implementation of gender equality
policies in action was the growth in female political representation. In the
2003 Constitution, 30% of seats in the Lower House, the Chamber of Deputies,
were reserved for women. In addition, 30% of positions in all decision-making
bodies at national and local levels were reserved for women (Hansen, 2017:
11-13). While the 30% minimum figure would put to shame more established
democratic states such as the USA or Australia, by 2008 Rwandan women held
over 56% of seats in the Lower House, and this figure has now risen to an
impressive 64%. Rwanda leads the world in having the largest percentage of
women in parliament. This is a very impressive statistic, an image bolstered
by legislation passed on gender-based violence, workforce participation and
property and inheritance rights. It looked to the world that, in Rwanda, gender
was being ‘mainstreamed’ and that women would play equal roles in political,
economic and social decision making. Jennie E. Burnet found through her
research into gender quotas and female empowerment, that women had
reaped benefits in the form of heightened respect within families and within
communities, accompanied by an increased capacity to speak and be heard in
public forums and better access to education. These changes produced some
negative consequences in terms of friction with male siblings over new
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inheritance laws, male withdrawal from local politics with the increase in
female representation and marital discord as women took on greater
responsibilities outside the family. Burnet’s main purpose in this research was
an evaluation of cultural meanings of national, local and party gender quotas.
A key finding of her research was that despite the greater legislated
representation of women in parliament this had not led to greater democracy
or a democratic legitimacy of the RPF dominated government (Burnet, 2011:
pp. 29-35).
The winners in terms of gender equality were the female urban elite, mainly
returnees, not the majority of Rwandan women. Although women occupied a
legislated majority in government, Burnet found that the Forum for Women
Parliamentarians (FWP), had struggled to find a clear, widespread women’s
agenda. The FWP was instrumental in bringing in gender-based violence
legislation in 2008, but in the following year it supported a bill reducing
maternity leave from eight weeks to two, and which increased working hours
from 40 to 45 hours per week. These moves drew cynical responses from the
majority of working women who believed that female politicians were putting
their RPF affiliations and individual interests ahead of the collective interests
of most women (Burnet, 2011: 303-344). Local power bases and RPF
allegiances were the fundamental drivers of most political outcomes. In
contemporary Rwanda, it continues to be politically strategic to be aligned
with the government in order to eliminate the fear of being charged with
divisionism or genocide ideology. It seems the increased presence of women
has not actually translated to increased power for women.
Kagame implemented a cabinet reshuffle in late February 2020 and increased
the number of positions from twenty seven to twenty nine. The Cabinet
comprises twenty Ministers, six Ministers of State, and any other member that
the President might want to include in decision-making. Women now make up
55% percent of the Cabinet. Portfolios allocated to women tend to be
education, health, social affairs and protection, gender and family promotion,
but women are making inroads into trade and industry and economic
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development. However, the Minister for Health, Dr Diane Gashumba lost her
job in the reshuffle for what the PM’s Office described as “habitual gross errors
and repeated failures during her tenure.” (Taarifa Rwanda: 2020). The Health
Ministry and the State Minister of Primary Healthcare have now reverted to
the male domain.

Rwanda and Women’s Rights
Rwanda has supported, voted in favour of or ratified an array of international
agreements protecting human rights and the fundamental rights of women
that encompass reproductive rights like the access to safe and legal abortion,
access to sexual and reproductive health services without discrimination and
freedom from gender-based violence. Specific agreements include the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1952 Convention on the
Political Rights of Women, the landmark 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well as the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 1993 Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the Convention on
Transnational Organised Crime’s 2003 Optional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, the 2007
UN Resolution on Eliminating Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in all
their Manifestations including in Conflict Related Situation, and the 2008
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 on Women, Peace and
Security on sexual violence between wars. A regional protocol, the Maputo
Protocol—the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights
on the Rights of Women in Africa—was ratified in 2004 (Institute of Policy
Analysis and Research – Rwanda, 2011: 6-7). The treaties ratified prior to
those signed and ratified by the Kagame government include CEDAW (1981),
CCPR (1975) and CESCR (1975). This is an impressive list of the Rwandan
ratification of international covenants on the rights and protection of women
and girls in conjunction with domestic and constitutional legislation on gender
equality, but by no means does this tell the full story of gender equality and
female empowerment in Rwanda.
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The evolution of human rights legislation over the past twenty years
recognizes that the denial of safe abortion services is a human rights violation.
United Nations monitoring bodies on signatories to these covenants stress
that, where abortion is legal under domestic law, it also has to be accessible in
practice. As outlined in a report by Fine (2017) for Ipas—an international NGO
that aims to increase access to safe abortions and contraception for women—
the denial of access to safe abortion is a violation of the right to health, privacy,
non-discrimination and freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment (Fine et al., 2017: 69-77).
In her research paper examining female political participation post genocide,
C.L. Hogg questions the effectiveness and legitimacy of gender equality
legislation that does not affect human rights abuses, authoritarianism,
oppression and corruption. She raises the fundamental issue that the goal of
gender equality should also incorporate the equal right to express dissent
without fear of charges of divisionism and genocide ideology and ultimately
imprisonment (Hogg, 2009: 34-37). In her index on Gender Quotas in Africa,
C.M. Arendt measures whether female quotas are used to empower women or
to reinforce party political control. Using her index on measuring Democracy
at gender quota adoption, Rwanda ranks Low; on the percentage of women in
legislature, Rwanda ranks High; on political competition, Rwanda again ranks
Low, as it does with the civic space to debate these laws (Arendt, 2018: 300304). Arendt concludes that political parties design quotas to reinforce their
policies and that gender quota laws are not essential to improve female
political participation. Female empowerment is measured by their
independence and freedom to dissent, not by their numbers in government
(Arendt, 2018: 302-303).
In the United Nations Human Development Report (2018) in their Gender
Equality Index, Rwanda ranks 156 out of 189 countries and lands in the
category of Low Human Development based on inequality in terms of
reproductive health, empowerment and economic status. In a comparative
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research piece in 2018, examining gender quotas in Burundi and Rwanda, the
authors concluded after interviews with 700 men and women, Hutu and Tutsi
that ethnicity outranked gender as an issue and as a major factor in political,
social and cultural life (Guariso et al., 2018). This counters President Kagame’s
revisionist analysis that ethnic tensions and rivalries were a colonial impost
(Guariso et al., 2018). A paradox exists that has seen a dramatic increase in
female participation in governance from parliament through to local councils,
while at the same time there has been an increasing authoritarianism of the
state, euphemistically described as a ‘transition to democracy’ (Burnet, 2008:
30-35). Burnet contends that in the short term an increase in female
representation has led to the inverse – less capacity to influence policy. She is
not entirely pessimistic with this outcome, anticipating that in the long term,
the greater acceptance and visibility of women in authority is preparation for
serious cultural and political change, should a genuine transition to democracy
take place (Burnet, 2008: 40-41).
One of the major obstacles to this transition is the linking of Rwanda’s gender
equality policy to nationalism, however any deviation from support for the
government results in suppression of dissent. The two female politicians who
have challenged the government have suffered reprisals. Diane Shima Rwigara
attempted to run on an independent ticket for president in 2017. Her
candidacy was immediately countered with the release of naked pictures of
her, and she was disqualified and charged with forgery and jailed for a year
before being released in October 2018. She has been publicly critical of
President Kagame for what she describes as his oppression of women. Victoire
Ingabire, leader of the FDU-Inkingi party was convicted of a terrorist
conspiracy to undermine the government and of downplaying the genocide.
She served six years of a fourteen-year jail term before being granted clemency
in September 2018 (Umuhoza, 2015). The conclusion to be drawn is that
loyalty to the RPF is a prerequisite for all parliamentarians, and it follows that
female parliamentarians are therefore committed to following the RPF line on
policy and implementation (Burnet, 2008: 30-35).
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Thesis Methodology and Method
Not surprisingly this thesis adopts a broadly feminist lens to explore issues of
gender, sexual violence and women’s health in Rwanda.
A feminist lens is the most rational method of assessing the effect of gender
equality policies on Rwandan women and girls. The issues chosen for this
thesis are foundational to the fundamental rights of women and girls
universally. Without the political will to implement these rights, Paul Kagame’s
gender equality policies are a façade. They constitute an abuse of human rights
and the treaties and covenants that Rwanda has ratified in relation to the
rights of women. One argument put forward is that the state had to be made
politically secure and without conflict to begin reconstruction post genocide.
Political security and peace translates for the RPF government as a Rwanda
with no dissent. Kagame rules an authoritarian state that tolerates no dissent
but there will always be subterranean unease with some outbursts of public
dissent while women and girls cannot access rights that are fundamental to
gender equality.
In order the shape the argument of what constitutes real gender equality in
Rwanda, I have drawn on a diversity of feminist scholarship throughout the
following chapters. This scholarship is not couched in feminist theory, but I
have drawn extensively on the research of Burnet (2008, 2011, 2012), Berry
(2014, 2015), Brown (2016), Thomson (2013) and Jessee (2017, 2020). Each
study draws very different conclusions, but their collective focus is on the
rights of Rwandan women. This thesis narrows the focus to the fundamental
rights of Rwandan women and the political and cultural suppression of these
beneath a facade of gender equality. I have drawn extensively on press reports,
on publications from advocacy groups, and to a limited extent on my own past
journalism. I have also drawn extensively on legislation, documents and
policies from the Republic of Rwanda in relation to the rights of women and
compared these with the reality. In attempting this research I was inspired by
a quote by Cynthia Enloe that reads like a universal rallying cry for women and
girls everywhere: “ It’s harder and harder to fool us. It’s harder and harder for
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people in authority to throw…tokenism at us and make us think we should
applaud” (Enloe 2017).
I had initially wanted to travel to Rwanda to conduct interviews. In my career
as a journalist and radio documentary maker, the construction of a story and
the gathering of content was always done on the ground—in Rwanda I had
always conducted face-to-face interviews with those affected, both
perpetrators and victims. This was not however possible with this particular
study due to the difficulties encountered in attempting to obtain approval for
ethics from University of Wollongong (UOW) in 2019 (which prevented me
attempting Zoom or telephone interviews) and because of COVID-19 (which
prevented any travel from Australia during 2020). It became impossible to
attempt to allay the concerns of UOW’s Research Ethics Committee that the
information being provided would not trigger distressing memories—of
genocide, sexual abuse, gender-based violence or other crimes—and that I
could not adequately protect the sources from possible psychological harm.
While I revised the ethics application to focus on health, the issues proved too
difficult to be resolved, especially given the amount of time given to complete
a Master of Research where the thesis is limited to one-year full time. While I
understood the position of the Ethics Committee, I reflected that, at least when
it comes to gathering information, the task of the journalist is in many ways
more fortunate when compared to that of the academic researcher. This
perfect storm of circumstances described above led to the thesis being based
on material compiled by other scholars. Fortunately, existing literature on
Rwanda includes many interviews with Rwandan women that relate to the
issues under examination.
In compiling the literature review, the scholarship that best informed the
shape and direction of this thesis was the academic research that has been
conducted in Rwanda which contains extensive interviews, often conducted
over many years of repeat visits. Scholarship on Rwanda pre genocide and
especially post genocide is becoming increasingly divided. In this thesis I have
attempted to reflect this in the diversity of the literature that I have examined
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and analysed. I have attempted to tell not a single story, but the complexity of
contradictions and paradoxes that is contemporary Rwanda, especially as it
relates to gender equality and the fundamental rights of women and girls.

Conclusion: The Myth versus the Reality of Fundamental Gender Equality
President Paul Kagame and the RPF government have through legislation and
dramatic policy changes, attempted to re-engineer a deeply patriarchal state
into one that is supposedly founded on gender equality. The government has
attempted this in the relatively short time frame of 26 years, following the
catastrophic 1994 genocide. The result has been that Rwanda leads the world
in the proportion of women representatives in government. Constitutionally
women are accorded gender equality, and legislation has been passed on
gender-based violence, workforce participation and property and inheritance
rights. Within this time frame one million people have also been lifted out of
poverty, there has been a dramatic increase in life expectancy, infant mortality
has dropped and there has been a rise in adult literacy. Rwanda has also
ratified a broad range of international covenants protecting the nondiscriminatory rights of women and girls.
Yet the domestic legislation and policy outlined in the literature review mask
a much more complex picture of the reality of gender equality. Exceeding
gender quotas in parliamentary representation while being unable to access
fundamental rights such as access to safe and legal abortion, freedom from a
scourge of gender-based violence and access to sexual and reproductive health
is the reality for women and girls in contemporary Rwanda. These are the
paradoxes and contradictions in a state that has rebuilt its domestic and
international reputation on gender equality, and these are the research gaps
that are explored and examined in the following three chapters.
One of the most contradictory aspects of this situation for Rwandan women is
the continued toleration of gender-based violence. Sexual and gender-based
violence is still considered to be a private matter, and a culture of silence is the
norm. The high rate of sexual and gender-based violence is ongoing despite
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the apparent protection accorded women and girls in the gender-based
violence (GBV) legislation from 2008.
When pregnancy results from sexual violence, access to abortion is highly
restrictive. Women and girls are punished by a penal code that includes
lengthy prison terms of three to five years for having or having assisted an
abortion. Despite impressive gender equality legislation, Rwanda’s cultural
context includes discrimination in accessing contraception, sex education,
community and family shaming, and religious, civil and political conservatism.
The paradox of a government that embraces gender equality, yet jails women
and girls for abortion, tolerates gender-based violence and prohibits access to
sexual and reproductive services, is examined in the following chapters. the
chapters are an examination of the reasons Rwandan women and girls are
denied these fundamental rights. What follows in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is an
exploration not of the myth of gender equality in Rwanda, but of the reality.
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Chapter Two: Gender-Based Violence
Gender-Based

violence

(GBV)

is

a

serious

problem

in

Rwanda.

Overwhelmingly, women, girls and children make up the highest proportion of
reported cases of GBV, and men and boys are the perpetrators. This situation
exists despite legislation that recognizes and directly targets gender-based
violence. Gender-based violence is defined as “any act that results in bodily,
psychological, sexual and/or economic harm to somebody just because they
are female or male. Such an act results in the deprivation of freedom and
negative consequences” (MIGEPROF, National Policy Against Gender-Based
Violence, 2011: 4). Conjugal rape, forcible abduction, sexual slavery and
harassment are included in the criminal code, however penalties range from
life imprisonment to sentences of six months to two years for conjugal rape
(Republic of Rwanda, Law on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-based
violence 2008: 81-83). Constitutionally, all individuals are guaranteed
protection from “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” with legislation
and policies framed to address, respond to and prevent violence against
women, girls and children.
However, the breadth of the problem was identified in a national demographic
and health survey (RDHS 2014-2015) cited in the National Gender Statistics
Report 2019, reporting 34.5% of women aged fifteen to forty-nine years had
experienced physical violence since age 15. In the same age category, 22.4% of
women and girls had experienced sexual violence since age 15.
GBV continues to be exist in a country where constitutionally, the life of the
individual is held to be sacred and inviolable, where everyone has a right to
life and the state is obligated to protect and defend every individual. Gender
and the eradication of all discrimination against women was identified as a
pivotal feature for the transformation of Rwanda from an agrarian society to a
knowledge based one in the government’s Vision 2020 policy paper (Rwanda
Vision 2020, 2003: 17). The Vision 2020 statement ranked gender equality as
the most critical issue underpinning economic growth and development. As a
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result of this enshrined in legislation, 30% of all parliamentary seats are
reserved for women. As at 2020 women are currently occupying 64% of Lower
House seats. Rwanda can legitimately demonstrate that in the 25 years after
the genocide, there has been a dramatic increase in life expectancy, a high
influx of female civil servants, a drop in infant mortality, a rise in adult literacy,
and by world standards a low international ranking for state corruption, as
defined by Transparency International. The paradox is that, in spite of the
successes in legislating and implementing gender equality policies, there still
exists a high prevalence of gender-based violence. The following section is an
exploration of why GBV continues to be a problem of such magnitude.

Statistics on Gender-Based Violence
Nationally, the statistics on the prevalence of gender- based violence, physical
and sexual, illuminate an ongoing and depressing problem. The National
Gender Statistics report (2019: 25-32), traced gender-based violence, physical
and sexual from 2005 to 2014-15. It compared gender-based violence against
men and women aged 15-49. The report particularly targeted the reproductive
health of women and the physical, emotional and mental health of their
children. The only conclusion to be drawn from the statistics was that genderbased violence in Rwanda remained a serious problem.
On sexual violence, 22.3% of Rwandan females suffered sexual violence in
2010, which was almost unchanged in 2014-15 when 22.4% of women
reported sexual violence. Both men and women reported multiple forms of
violence. On spousal violence, 31% of women reported physical violence
committed by a current or most recent partner or spouse (National Gender
Statistics Report, 2019: 25-32). The Rwanda Voluntary National Report (VNR)
2019, drew on the same statistics and concluded that much greater efforts
were needed to address sexual gender-based violence, which seems a weak
response to the continuing high prevalence of GBV against women, girls and
children. The high incidence of GBV is countered by glowing references to
Rwanda’s “strong political will” (VNR, 2019: 76) in mainstreaming gender into
government policies. The reality of female empowerment in Rwanda is best
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addressed in the findings of Jessica Hansen who notes that gender-based
violence will not diminish in a state that devalues human rights (Hansen, 2017:
19-22).

The Constitution and Gender-Based Violence
Within the Rwandan Constitution, discrimination of any kind—whether based
on ethnicity, tribe, colour, clan, sex, region, social origin, religion or faith,
opinion, economic status, culture, language, social status, physical or mental
disability—is prohibited and punishable by law. Every child, according to the
Constitution, is entitled to “special measures of protection by his or her family,
society and the State, depending on the status of the child, under national and
international law”. Every Rwandan adult and child is guaranteed protection
under this broad sweep of rights and yet widespread gender-based violence is
a common crime that undermines these protections. Fundamental human
rights like the sacredness and the inviolability of the individual, the right to
life, right to mental and physical integrity are all addressed in the constitution
and later revisions.
Hogg makes the critical assessment that these gender equality policies have
not translated to widespread female empowerment (Hogg, 2009: 34-54). Her
argument is that these policies were politically strategic for the RPF
dominated government to subvert and oppress any meaningful opposition or
political freedom. Hogg’s assessment is strengthened and supported by Onditi
and Odera who argue that a state that has not implemented a strong human
rights framework will always struggle with female empowerment, in all its
forms, no matter what gender equality legislation is in place (Onditi and Odera,
2017: 1-3). Burnet does not discount benefits for Rwandan women in that
more women are more confident to speak publicly in village forums, some feel
more capable of making decisions within their families, and there is greater
access to education. Some of the fallout has been conflict with male siblings
over changes in inheritance laws and marital discord as women expanded
their roles beyond the family (Burnet, 2011: 320-340). However, Burnet, in
accord with Hogg, Onditi and Odera, is unequivocal; legislated female
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representation in parliament has not improved or increased the democratic
legitimacy of this government.
It is important to frame the constraints on gender equality and women’s
empowerment and gender within the consolidation of the RPF government
and the cementing of President Paul Kagame’s authority. For example, a
referendum in December 2015 to amend the constitution to allow the
president to run for a third term was passed by 98.3% of voters. This was
coupled with a motion to reduce the presidential term from seven to five years,
which will take effect from 2024 (Platas, 2017). As one of Kagame’s most
vociferous critics, Filip Reyntjens observed there were no debates, no
demonstrations, both houses of parliament unanimously approved the
constitutional change, and only ten Rwandans registered any opposition after
national consultations. The referendum passed with an astounding 98.3%
voter approval (Reyntjens, 2016), numbers reminiscent of elections run by
Bashar Al-Assad of Syria, Saddam Hussein of Iraq or Kim Jong Il of North Korea
or Russia’s Vladamir Putin.

The Law and Culture and GBV
Rwandan female politicians were the main drivers behind the bill for the
Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based Violence in 2008. This followed
consultations with ministries, judiciary, grass roots groups and interviews
with 720 women. The motivation for legislative action on GBV was that
national police statistics recorded over six and a half thousand cases of
violence against women, girls and children between 2002 and 2004. Given
many instances of GBV would have been unreported, this was clearly an issue
of epidemic proportions. Penalties enshrined in the criminal code included life
imprisonment where rape resulted in a terminal illness or death or the
deliberate transmission of a terminal illness, or sexual torture. Conjugal rape
attracted a relatively low range penalty of six months to two years, as did child
neglect, attracting penalties of six months to three years. And yet despite
legislation directly targeting gender-based violence in all its forms, violence
against women, girls and children continues to be a huge national issue.
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A 2008 United Nations assessment of gender-based violence against Rwandan
women found the challenges local organizations faced included the difficulties
of disseminating and implementing existing laws and involving men in
addressing violence against women. The numbers of victims were so large that
local organizations lacked the skills and ability to deal with them. The
population was also reluctant to attend sensitization meetings, women
refused to name perpetrators out of fear and shame, and underlying all these
challenges there existed deep-rooted patriarchal values (UN Women Global
Database on Violence Against Women, 2008: 11-17). A study of intimate
partner violence in 2016 attempted to unravel the ineffectiveness of the law.
The results were confronting, but not that surprising in a state where gender
equality policies were imposed from the top down. An article in the journal
PLOS One found that there still existed a big gap between the law designed to
protect women and the strongly gendered norms and values that stressed
male dominance and control (Umubyeyi et al., 2016: 2).
Abused women were reluctant to seek help and support because of the shame
of the abuse, poverty, financial dependence, gender inequality, and a desire to
keep violence as a private matter. Women who suffered physical injuries and
long term psychological injury were reluctant or unable to leave a partner
because of their economic dependency. There was poor awareness that
conjugal rape was a crime, and it followed that few married women sought
help and support. The obstacles women and girls had to overcome in reporting
sexual violence and seeking help and support were immense. Jailing or fining
perpetrators was of little benefit to women because of their economic
dependency on the abusive partner and isolation and poverty being their only
options. Women also refrained from reporting abuse out of fear that this would
attract further violence (Umubyeyi, 2016: 3-8). If a rape charge was to go to
trial, one of the most significant legal obstacles for the complainant was the
prosecution demand that there be obvious forensic signs of violence
(Umubyeyi, 2016: 7). The report concluded that the law needed revising,
especially in relation to rape, and that the acceptance of gender-based violence
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as an abuse of human rights was a critical factor in acknowledging it as a
serious crime. It is the magnitude of gender inequality that prevents abused
women from seeking help and support despite the legislation drafted to
protect them. As Umubyeyi et al. found in their interviews in 2016, men were
reluctant to accept the new legislation and relinquish control. This combined
with women’s financial dependency and male and sometimes female
ignorance of what constituted sexual violence, allows gender-based violence
to continue as a national scourge (Umubyeyi et al., 2016: 5-9). The Ministry of
Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF 2011) likewise found it to be one
of the main obstacles because of the “entrenched idea of the distinct gender
roles of men and women, boys and girls”. Many acts of gender- based violence
were considered ‘normal’. Although conjugal rape was a crime, it was not
always held to be one by communities. Women, as well as men, saw sexual
intercourse as a man’s conjugal right. Other forms of domestic violence like
beatings, physical injury, denial of property rights, verbal insults, and
psychological harassment were often viewed as ‘family matters’ (MIGEPROF
2011). In an examination of the national extent of the problem, the report
found that gender-based violence both reflected and reinforced inequities
between men and women and compromised the health, dignity, security and
autonomy of the victims along with the violation of a wide range of human
rights. These included the sexual abuse of children, rape, sexual assault and
harassment, the trafficking of women and girls and in some regions, the
traditional practice of female genital mutilation. Gender-based violence
against women and girls was perpetuated by their ‘chronic economic
dependency’ (MIGEPROF 2011), and equally poor knowledge of their rights
and especially the anti-GBV law, alcohol abuse, illegal marriages, affairs and
intimidation. Other consequences of gender-based violence included
depression, fear, lack of self-esteem and extreme stress.
In a follow-up study, examining the implementation of the 2011 MIGEPROF
report, it was found that GBV was still a serious problem (Rwanda Civil Society
Platform RCSP, 2018:13-14). It drew on various surveys, but one that targeted
women and girls between 15-49 years (DHS 2014-15) revealed that men and
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an even larger proportion of women, agreed that men were justified in beating
their wives for reasons such as burning the food, going out without telling their
husband, neglecting the children and refusing to have sex with him. Male
abusers were often not aware of committing any crime or misdemeanor and
the conclusion drawn was that continuous collaborative work was needed if
there was to be any cultural change as “change comes slowly” (RCSP, 2018: 1113). Gender was often confused with feminism—seen as a Western notion—
and “this does not bear good fruit’ (RCSP, 2018: 39). However, the politics of
transformation, post genocide, are also a critical factor in the ongoing
prevalence of GBV. In debating whether gender equality policies lead to the
political inclusion or exclusion, Jessica Hansen argues it would be simplistic to
assume that rapid cultural change would follow legislative change post
genocide. In the broadest political context, one can conclude that gender
inequalities, where GBV remains a prevalent factor, will not subside in an
authoritarian state where human rights are not highly valued (Hansen, 2017:
19-22).

The Legacy of the Genocide
The scale and savagery of sexual violence during the genocide was
unprecedented with Tutsi women and girls being the main targets. The scale
of sexual violence during the genocide reflected the magnitude of the conflict
and the ethnic hatred generated specifically against Tutsi women and girls.
Rape was defined as a genocidal crime by the ICTR, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and I address this later within this chapter. Widespread
gender-based violence and the toleration of it, was culturally commonplace.
This was evidenced by a survey carried out by the Association of the Widows
of the Genocide, (AVEGA AGAHOZO, 1999), over a 5 year period. The initial
focus was the victims of sexual violence during the genocide, but as the
research progressed, it found that violence against women in towns and
villages nationally was a daily occurrence. The research evolved into an
examination of sexual violence during the genocide and daily sexual and
domestic violence (AVEGA AGAHOZA, 1999: 3). One of the specific objectives
was to study the link between violence in states of relative peace and violence
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in conflict situations. Daily violence was found to be widespread although the
scale and savagery of sexual violence during the genocide reflected the
magnitude of the conflict and the ethnic hatred generated specifically towards
Tutsi women. One of the more disturbing findings was that aside from the
horrific genocidal violence and torture (AVEGA, 1999:18-22), ongoing daily
violence inflicted on Rwandan women, girls and minors was “deeply rooted in
memory and habits” and more difficult to eradicate than the aftermath of the
genocide (AVEGA, 1999: 34). Such finding are broadly in line with the Women
Peace and Security Agenda (UNSCR1325 of 2000) which notes that women
and girls are often primary targets in war, and that the cessation of conflict
does not mean an end to gender-based violence, rather that in many situations
it intensifies.
Rape as a genocidal crime, was first defined under international law by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established by the United
Nations Security Council in 1997, to prosecute the perpetrators of genocide.
Sexual violence took many forms in ICTR judgments – rape, torture, inhumane
acts were categorized as crimes against humanity or genocide and outrages
against personal dignity were charged under war crimes (International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Prosecution of Sexual Violence, 2014). The
linkage between sexual violence as a cultural norm and the prosecution of it
as an international crime was exemplified during one hearing before the ICTR,
where an accused, charged with rape, explained to the court that “ in Rwandan
tradition and culture, rape has never existed” (ICTR, para 4 ). The culture of
silence, in relation to sexual violence, was exemplified by the reluctance of
victims and witnesses to be heard by the ICTR. Some were reticent to talk
about sexual violence to male investigators, but they also feared reprisals from
the accused or families of the accused. These fears were compounded by the
stigma of being a victim of sexual violence —a cultural stigma that existed
prior to the genocide. The same reluctance was evident in the gacaca
community courts, although a lower standard of proof was required compared
to the ICTR. The reluctance of victims to be heard in gacaca courts exemplifies
many of the reasons a culture of silence is the norm, a situation in which
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gender-based violence flourishes. Some victims feared their evidence would
not remain confidential, others feared that the judges could be related to the
accused; that judges could be bribed; that the rapists were not identifiable or
had died, and that the perpetrators got a lighter sentence if they confessed. In
alignment with cultural norms, some women and girls chose not to proceed
with charges, because they had not told spouses or their families of the rape
or rapes, and they did not want to create problems within their communities
(HRW Rwanda, 2004: 9-12).
Sara E. Brown draws a dramatically different conclusion from the legacy of the
genocide. Her argument is that it took the catalytic impact of the mass killings
to transition the state from a patriarchal one subordinating women to one
committed to advancing women’s rights (Brown, 2016: 243). She advances an
argument that, while these changes might have happened through the impact
of globalization, democratization or modernization, the transition could not
have happened with such speed without the catalytic agent of the genocide.
Brown describes Rwanda’s gender mainstreaming as ‘exceptional’ in
comparison with neighboring countries (2016: 243). This is not to say that
Brown dismisses the challenges to the implementation of gender equality
policies. These are represented by the rural/urban divide, in which female
urban returnees tend to do much better than their rural sisters in a culture
that is still rife with the old norms of masculinity and femininity (2016: 243).
Brown is correct about the catalytic impact of the genocide—in post conflict
Rwanda women comprised 70% of the population, and it was essential and
politically strategic for women to step into roles in order to rebuild the state.
Legislated gender quotas alone do not however change a deeply rooted
patriarchal culture. What Brown does not address is what must be
foundational to gender equality, even in a democratic state in transition:
freedom from gender-based violence, access to abortion and sexual and
reproductive health.
The expectation was that the introduction of a political quota system would
not only improve women’s status and as a consequence, but would mark a
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decrease in gender-based violence. This has not been the case (Hansen, 2017:
22). Jessica Hansen’s powerful and compelling argument is that the cultural
and political discrimination against Rwandan women and girls exists in a
repressive authoritarian state and until these human rights abuses are
addressed, there will be no real change in the status of women and girls. Brown
does not address the grip of the authoritarian state ruled by an authoritarian
government that controls the extent and reach of gender equality. Hansen
expresses some optimism that increased female political representation
“could prepare the path for Rwandan democracy” (Hansen, 2017: 22). What
also needs addressing here is the reconstructed official narrative pregenocide, in which in the new version, as conceived by the RPF government,
had Rwandans living in unified harmony in pre-colonial times, with no ethnic
divisions. This is contrary to evidence that ethnic conflicts increased during
the late colonial period (Longman, 2017: 244). He draws a conclusion that it
was politically strategic to deflect blame to outsiders rather than blame
Rwandans. Longman also believes that the ongoing repression of fundamental
rights prevents the population uniting around a common agreement of the
past, and in the long-term, this can only divide the state further (Longman,
2017: 270).

Gender Monitoring Office
The Gender Monitoring Office (GMO) was established in 2008 to oversee the
implementation of the government’s gender equality policies and the
effectiveness of the state’s response to gender-based violence. A 2010
assessment of services to counter gender-based violence reported that a wide
range of government institutions, local administration, UN agencies and civil
society organizations had collaborated in mobilizing the community to combat
GBV with protection, legal assistance, health and psychosocial services. In
assessing these services, the Gender Monitoring Office found that the 32
organizations working on GBV canvassed sensitization to GBV, education,
female empowerment, and legal, medical and economic support. A more
forensic follow-up measuring attitudinal and cultural changes would have
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delivered a more accurate assessment of effectiveness. This assessment read
like a promotional and public relations exercise for the GMO.
Rwanda ranked 9th in the global Gender Gap Index conducted by the World
Economic Forum (WEF) for the 2020 index (published December 2019);
Germany ranked 14th. Rwanda had actually dropped three places from the
previous ranking year, falling from sixth to ninth. In the 2020 index Rwanda
was ranked as the only African country among the top ten countries in gender
parity. Antonio Cascais (DW.com. 2019) commented that this was not a
widespread or an accurate picture of female empowerment in Rwanda. Even
the Kagame government did not display a totally united and positive
assessment of gender equality as related to gender-based violence. More
realistic assessments emerged from some ministries. The Speaker of the
House, Donatille Mukabalisa, described Rwanda in 2019 as still a patriarchal
society and proposed gender issues be included in the budget, education,
agriculture and infrastructure development, rather than being confined within
the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, the traditional domain of
women’s issues (Cascais, 2019).

Rwanda Vision 2020
“Gender is to be integrated as a cross cutting issue in all development policies”
is the bold statement from the underlying Rwanda Vision 2020, drafted in 2000
by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The transformation was to
be built around six pillars: good governance and a capable state; human
resource development and a knowledge based economy; a private sector led
economy; infrastructure development; productive market based agriculture;
and regional and international economic integration. A successful
transformation would necessitate an annual growth rate of 7% along with a
doubling of the population from eight to sixteen million. Gender equality was
the means to achieving this. Vision 2020 committed to a continuous updating
and adaption of the laws relating to gender, education for all and positive
discrimination that favored women. A 2012 review of the Rwanda Vision 2020
(2003) found that the country did well in an Ease of Doing Business report and
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was given a thumbs up by the World Bank. This proved very attractive to
ongoing commitment from international business and donor aid. But on
political governance—freedom of expression and human rights, the score was
far lower and Rwanda was ranked among the 10% of the world’s worst
performing countries (Ansoms and Rostango, 2012: 7-11).
Vision 2020 does not fare well against performance indicators in the
Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century report (UNDP, 2019).
These indicators included female empowerment, reproductive health,
violence against women and girls, quality of health, education and standard of
living. The Index divided rankings as follows: Very High Human Development,
High Human Development, Medium Human Development and Low Human
Development.
Twenty-five years post- genocide, Rwanda was ranked 157 out of 189
countries in HDI and was situated in the ‘Low Human Development’ category
(UNDP, 2019). This failure was attributed to there being only one agenda in an
examination of stalled democratic transitions in Rwanda and South Africa
(Beresford et al., 2018). The agenda was that of the RPF-dominated
government. There was no middle ground and no tolerance of any political
opposition. President Kagame equated any foreign criticism of his policies and
strategies as ongoing colonialism, slavery, Western arrogance and bigotry
(Burnet, 2011). His authoritarian rule crushed civil society. Initially
international protests were muted in response to human rights abuses,
possibly due to a collective guilt over the lack of response to the genocide.
Critical exceptions have been external NGOs, human rights advocates and
some academics. Vision 2020 defined female empowerment within the
constraints of an authoritarian state. Exemplars of these constraints were the
two female politicians, Diane Shima Rwigara and Victoire Ingabire, who were
imprisoned for their strong public opposition to government policies.
Released upon appeal to the High Court in late 2018, Rwandan journalist, Fred
Muvunyi, working outside of the country, commented, “if you claim you are
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empowering women and yet at the same time, you put in prison those who feel
empowered, what kind of empowerment is that?” (Cascais, 2019: DW.com).

Violence Against Children
One of the most alarming aspects of the magnitude of gender-based violence
in Rwanda is contained in a 2018 survey of violence against children, and the
cultural attitudes that have allowed this to flourish. In short, violence against
children in Rwanda is endemic (VACYS 2015-16: 8). This government survey
provided, for the first time, national estimates of the magnitude and type of
sexual, physical and emotional violence experienced by children. More than
1,000 females and more than 1,100 males took part in the study, which divided
the range for children to 13-17 years and for youth 18-24 years. The Violence
against Children and Youth Survey found that 34% of both females and males
in the 13-17 age group had first experienced sexual violence prior to the age
of 13, while 46% of females aged 13-17 reported their first sexual experience
as rape. The perpetrators were most often neighbors with the abuse
happening at the child’s home, or at the perpetrator’s, or in the town or village.
There seemed no safe place for a child. On physical violence, a greater
proportion of males experienced physical violence, 60% as against 37% of
females. Among those aged 18-24 years, 87% women and 94% of men
reported more than one incident of physical violence in the twelve months
prior to the survey.
Physical violence meted out to both females and males included punching,
whipping and kicking, with perpetrators being parents, teachers and
classmates.
There was an overlap of the three forms of violence—sexual, physical and
emotional. With children, 9% of females reported two or all three forms of
violence in the twelve months prior to the survey. Among male children
experiencing two or three forms of violence, the proportion was 11%. Among
youth, 18% of both females and males reported two or all three forms of
violence, prior to age 18. The reporting of sexual violence was poor; and even
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those who did report it, found that rarely was there any follow-up. A culture of
silence existed with four in ten females telling absolutely no one. The silence
also applied to two thirds of males interviewed. The damning conclusion
drawn in relation to the non-reporting of sexual violence by female victims
was that it was not considered a problem. This last reason was given by
children (aged 13-17) and youth (aged 19-24) themselves, as one of the
barriers to seeking help for incidents of sexual abuse. Other barriers included
fear of getting into trouble, embarrassment for self or family, not needing or
wanting services or feeling it was “my fault”. There was a high awareness of
services offered, for those who had experienced sexual violence; but it was
uncommon to make use of these (VACYS, 2015-16: 46).
The implications to be drawn from this initial survey on violence against
children and youth are that it reflects a general acceptance of violence against
children. There appears to be minimal awareness of the harm caused by
violence and the long-term psychological and emotional impact. The children
were fearful of getting into trouble and were embarrassed for themselves and
their families. The high prevalence of violence against children and youth
persists, in spite of a range of laws in place, for their protection. These laws
included and it is worth listing them: the Rights and Protection of the Child
2012; the law on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-based Violence 2009;
the law Governing Persons and Family 2016; the Justice for Children policy
2014; and the National Strategic Plan fighting gender-based violence 20112016. In response to the ongoing endemic violence, the VACYS report
recommended that judicial and political enforcement was needed to protect
Rwandan children, as well as the need to shift the cultural normalcy that
tolerated such violence.

Isange One-Stop Centres
The multi-functional Isange One-Stop Centres were set up to provide
comprehensive services to all victims of gender-based violence, under the
same roof, free of charge on a 24-hour, 7 day a week basis. The services include
medical care, psychosocial support, legal services, relief, temporary shelter
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and re-integration (Cousins, 2018). The multi- purpose nature of these centres
locates them way ahead of almost all community and village level providers,
where the training and quality of the message on gender is questionable,
follow-up is minimal and any assessment of attitudinal change, non-existent.
However, an earlier survey by Umubyeyi et al., 2016: 7-8) portrayed a low
awareness of what was on offer with respondents barely aware of the centres
and unlikely to use them as this would have meant a public acknowledgement
of abuse and hence shameful to the family. These findings indicated that one
stop centres were not the preferred option for abused women. In assessing
anti GBV actions in 2018, eighty-nine percent of respondents reported that
implementation of these policies, ‘faced challenges’ (Rwanda Civil Society
Platform 2018) and these were linked to cultural beliefs and practices such as:
the persistence of traditional views of masculinity and women’s roles; the
persistence of a lack of compassion towards gender equality and equality;
grassroots authorities tending to cover up crimes, especially if suspects are
family members (reported as ‘negative solidarity’); GBV still being tolerated
by women and men for reasons such as an avoidance of family conflict,
marriage preservation, and the avoidance of conflict with a sexual perpetrator,
especially one in a more powerful position (RCSP). The healthcare staff at
Isange Centres, as assessed by the RCSP, were the only ones adequately
equipped to realistically report on gender-based violence and provide support
for women and girls (Rwanda Civil Society Platform 2018).

Conclusion
As evidenced, the challenges involved in combating GBV are immense. Cultural
beliefs remain a massive impediment to change. However, these cultural
values and traditions exist within a political framework of an authoritarian
state with a poor human rights record, but legislatively impressive gender
equality policies. This is a pessimistic view, but one grounded in existing rigid
cultural beliefs and entrenched ideas of male and female stereotypes. These
conclusions are drawn relatively early (2011) by one of the government’s own
ministries (MIGEPROF) in a national report on GBV. In this report many acts
of gender-based violence were culturally regarded as normal behaviour. The
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high levels of GBV had far-reaching physical and psychological consequences
and perpetuated male power, sustained by a culture of silence. The 2011
MIGEPROF report is impressive in its scope, the extent of GBV, its impact
across all stratas of society, on economic development and on human rights
(2011: 5-8). The fact that GBV continues to be major issue with an ongoing and
devastating impact a decade on from the findings of this report, demonstrates
the strength of the opposition to creating real gender equality. This opposition
is cultural, religious, judicial and political. It is not difficult to draw the
conclusion that there is a lack of political will when it comes to enforcing the
legislative changes. The GBV law was promulgated in 2008, but while conjugal
rape is not always held to be crime by the community, and women, along with
men, view sexual intercourse as a man’s conjugal right, cultural change will be
glacially slow.
The national government report on violence against children and youth
(VACYS 2015-16) is disturbing in its magnitude, type and cultural
implications. While thirty-four percent of girls and boys (aged 13-17), had
experienced sexual violence, prior to age thirteen, the victims rarely reported
the abuse. When they did, there was rarely any follow-up. The alarming
conclusion drawn in the VACYS report, of children and young people not
reporting sexual or physical violence, is that children and young people gave
as one of the reasons, that the abuse was not a problem.
As Hansen has stated, it would be simplistic to assume that legislative change
is followed by rapid cultural change. After a catastrophic genocide, Rwanda is
politically in transition, culturally resistant to change, highly dependent on
international aid while seeking legitimacy on the international stage with the
promotion of gender equality credentials. But there has been no
corresponding decrease in gender-based violence in spite of gender quota
systems legislated to enhance female empowerment. Evidence leads to the
conclusion that gender-based violence will remain prevalent and pervasive in
this authoritarian state, no matter what gender equality legislation is in place
(Hansen, 2017: 19-22).
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The next chapter continues the examination of Rwanda’s actual performance
with issues that matter to women’s rights and focusses on the access to safe
abortion services.
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Chapter Three: Abortion
This is the story of Anne, 20 years old and serving a prison sentence in
Karubanda since 2007 for having had an abortion. She was brought up by her
father as her mother died when she was very young.
I was in the 5th year of my secondary education when a teacher at my school
started dating me. I needed school materials and since I could not afford them I
allowed to have sexual intercourse(sic) with this teacher at this tender age. With
limited knowledge on contraception use, I got pregnant and had to drop out of
school since it’s against school regulations. I decided to have an abortion and my
elder brother out of fear reported me to the police. I am supposed to serve a period
of 9 years of which I’ve so far completed 3 years (Umuhoza et al., 2013: 50).

For decades prior to Anne’s imprisonment, abortion was effectively banned in
Rwanda and was only permissible for the preservation of the physical or
mental health of the mother. Women and girls were jailed for ‘committing’
abortion under all other circumstances and jail terms ranged from five to
fifteen years. This punitive penal code reflected Rwandan society norms and
values of gender inequality, religious, cultural and political rigidity, and the
punitive measures meted out to women attempting to access their basic right
to reproductive health. However, in spite of immense legal and cultural
barriers, the rate of abortion was high. The Guttmacher Institute estimated
there were 60,000 abortions annually, with the majority being illegal and
unsafe (Ipas, 2015: 5). This chapter explores the contradictions inherent
between the impressive gender equality policies written into the 2003
Rwandan constitution and the lived reality of women and girls seeking safe
abortions. This section will outline the impetus for change and the forces that
strongly opposed or restricted change to the punitive law on abortion.
In an historical perspective on family planning, Erin Jessee reported that
women and girls who were unable to demonstrate that an abortion was
necessary to preserve their physical or mental health had two options. They
could proceed with the birth or seek an illegal and unsafe termination that
carried a complication rate of forty-four percent (2020: 237). Rural women
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had a higher complication rate of 67 % among women who self- induced, and
slightly lower if they sought an abortion from a ‘traditional healer’ (61 %)
(Jessee, 2020: 237; Guttmacher Institute, 2013). The impact on young single
Rwandan women seeking an abortion was especially severe. They were
condemned for being pregnant and unmarried. Parents often threw them out
of home for being pregnant, and those who were still at school were expelled.
It was these young women who would seek “traditional” and frequently unsafe
methods to abort (Umuhoza et al., 2013: 51). A 2008 UN Women (UNIFEM)
study across four districts in Rwanda, found that 86% of respondents reported
they were pregnant due to rape by a family member or in the workplace
(UNIFEM cited in Umuhoza et al., 2013: 51) Culturally, and in the eyes of the
law, women and girls were the guilty parties. Culturally, and in the eyes of the
law, men and boys bore no responsibility or guilt, and there was no exploration
of the reasons for the spiraling number of unwanted pregnancies among young
women and girls under eighteen. Widespread sexual violence was a critical
factor along with very limited access to contraception, as all permissible forms
of contraception were culturally regarded as solely for married couples.

The Drive for Change
It took a group of young Rwandan women, members of the youth action group
YAM—the youth wing of the Association Rwandaise pour le Bien-Etre Familial
(Rwandan Association for Family Wellbeing) (ARBEF)—to advocate for safe,
non-discriminatory abortion and the reproductive rights of all women. In
collaboration with a Dutch NGO, YAM gathered data on young women
hospitalized or jailed for procuring or attempting to procure an abortion
(Umohoza et al., 2013: 50-51; Jessee, 2020: 237). YAM and ARBEF linked up
with the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), and this
coalition of domestic and international bodies took up the fight against
Rwanda’s legal and political repression of women’s reproductive rights. The
campaigns were well targeted to the Ministries of Health, Gender and Family
Promotion, Justice, the National Women’s Council and the National Youth
Council. Tactically, it gave face to the culture of silence around abortion, by
delivering testimonies from women and girls from within jails and hospitals.
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It gave a factual base to their campaigns, which emphasized the reasons for
unwanted pregnancies as sexual violence, lack of access to information and
contraception, but the fundamental base of all of these reasons was the issue
of gender inequality. The YAM group also made skillful use of the domestic
media and the fact that it was young women themselves, who addressed the
highly divisive issue of abortion pressured some of the less conservative
policymakers.
There were also other factors that drove the campaign for change. Domestic
advocacy coincided with the ratification of international and regional
conventions supporting women’s reproductive rights like the 2003 Protocol
to the African Charter on Human Rights and the Rights of Women in Africa
(Maputo Protocol), which entered into force in 2005. The Ministry of Health
also put together a five-year plan to provide safe abortion to all women in need
and to reduce the death rate from unsafe abortions (Hodoglugil et al., 2017:
83). Politically, Rwanda was, and continues to be, a state heavily reliant on
international aid, with the health sector being one of the major recipients.
From this budget, the government used almost 11% of the reproductive health
budget treating complications from unsafe abortions (Santoshini, 2019: 3).
This was unsustainable against evidence that nearly half of all pregnancies in
Rwanda were unintended, and 22% of these ended in induced abortions.
Recording testimonies from inside jails in 2010 and 2011, YAM found that in
Karubanda jail, 21 out of 114 women were there for abortions and 90% were
25 years or younger. Chantal Umuhoza, from the feminist group SPECTRA,
while emphasizing the magnitude of unsafe abortions in Rwanda, noted: “Even
if there is one woman who wants the service, then by not providing this
service, we are literally telling the women that she can go and die” (Santoshini,
2019: 4).
The Penal code was reformed in 2012, (PC-2012), and although still highly
restrictive, did legally loosen access to abortion. Critically, pregnancy resulting
from gender-based violence was linked to legal abortion services.
Terminations became available, if proven, in cases of rape, incest, forced
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marriage and in some cases of risk to the health of the mother or fetus, but it
required a court order, along with written approval from two doctors granting
permission. This was not easy in a country where access to medical support
was very limited—there was a ratio of one doctor for every 17,000 citizens,
70% of the population lived and worked rurally, and women and girls
continued to battle cultural shame and stigma (Santoshini, 2019: 5).
Amendments to the abortion law were legislated despite heavy opposition
from the Catholic Church. But the conditions were quite prohibitive in
obtaining permission for a legal abortion. This was exemplified by the fact that,
following the 2012 amendments, only three cases went before the courts. The
Health Development Initiative (HDI) a Rwanda based non-profit, reported that
over a 3-month period in 2014, just 5% of women who were pregnant as result
of rape, incest or forced marriage, sought an abortion. Not a single court order
was successful. There was still a long way to go in shifting cultural, legal and
political and religious opposition to women’s reproductive rights.

The Real Impact of the 2012 Abortion Reforms
An Ipas report reviewed the impact of the 2012 abortion reforms on women
and girls by interviewing a selection of inmates from among the three hundred
and thirteen imprisoned for abortion in five jails across Rwanda (Kane et al.,
2015: 9). The Rwandan Ministry of Health approved the review, as did the
Rwandan Correctional Services (RCS). Kane suspected that the number of
women incarcerated for illegal abortions was underreported by the RCS. The
numbers of women prisoners jailed for abortion makes for sobering reading
with approximately a quarter of the inmates in the five jails imprisoned for
abortion. Their experiences were fairly uniform. All had suffered injuries from
unsafe abortions and had sought emergency care from within their
communities, but had been reported by families, neighbors and healthcare
workers to the police. Arrests followed these reports and this was one of the
more disturbing aspects of the criminalizing of abortion because Rwandan
law, as it then stood, made it an offence not to report the ‘crime’. Community
policing was part of national police policy in addressing local problems like
GBV ostensibly, but local knowledge also delivered intelligence on abortions.
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Many of these women according to Kane, may well have qualified for a legal
abortion under the reformed code, but were ill informed as to their rights, or
not able to meet all requirements for approval (Kane et al., 2015: 11-12).
Shame and stigma in reporting rape, incest and physical or mental capacity
were just two of the cultural barriers to seeking an abortion. According to the
Solidarity for African Women’s Rights Coalition (SOAWR) rape and incest were
rarely reported because of the stigma and shame, and therefore these cases
rarely made it to the court system (Kane et al., 2015: 15). Compounding these
obstacles was the prevalence of HIV among sexually active women and girls. A
2014 survey found that the highest prevalence of HIV positive was with
women aged 35-39 (Kane et al., 2015:13). Added to this was the cost, and
harassment, intimidation and extortion by some members of the police force.
A successful prosecution for an illegal abortion could result in the woman or
young girl facing one to three years in jail, and a fine the equivalent of US$300.
Political will in reforming a draconian penal code, did not translate into the
provision of safe and accessible abortion services for young women and girls.
The 2015 Ipas report unsurprisingly drew the conclusion that ‘little had
changed on the ground’ following the 2012 abortion review, as legal abortions
remained inaccessible for most women and girls. This was despite Rwanda
being a party to and having ratified various treaties on reproductive rights and
safe abortions. These included the Maputo Protocol, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights (ICECR) (Kane
et al., 2015: 20; Fine et al., 2017).

Cultural Barriers
The social and cultural histories of the women and girls seeking abortions had
the common feature of sexual and gender-based violence, rural poverty,
subordination, gender inequality and legacy of the genocide. Several of the
girls were pregnant to men who paid for school fees, clothing and food. Most
of the women and girls refused to give information about families and friends
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because of the stigma of abortion and the fact that knowing of the pregnancy
and abortion could lead their arrest of family and friends. A majority of the
women reported that their parents had died during the genocide and they had
little or no family support. Almost half of all pregnancies were unintended and
22% of these ended in an induced abortion. A further review of the 2012
legislative changes delivered a key finding that the pervasiveness and strength
of the culture of silence and stigma around rape and abortion meant most
women and girls chose silence and resorted to unsafe terminations rather than
going public by seeking a court order (Hodoglugil et al., 2017: 88). A woman
disclosing that she was pregnant as a result of rape, drew a real risk of being
marginalized and shamed within her community, and greatly reduced any
prospect of marriage. Almost insurmountable challenges faced women and
girls seeking court orders to prove that a pregnancy was the result of rape,
incest or forced marriage. In the case of rape, according to GBV procedure in
place at the time, a victim had to present herself to a health centre within 72
hours of the sexual assault, but if it was left until the pregnancy was confirmed
the case was registered as an abuse of the system (Hodoglugil et al., 2017: 88).
Hence it was almost impossible to get a court order for a legal abortion.
Compounding cultural obstacles to securing a legal abortion was the fact that
some the GBV counselors had limited knowledge of PC-2012, and as a result
did not offer abortion as an option. (Hodoglugil et al., 2017: 88-89). The most
accurate reading of this situation is that some health care workers did not
understand that abortion was actually an option. While other healthcare
workers counseled women to proceed with the pregnancy as a means of
coping with rape trauma, as they acknowledged the difficulty of getting a court
order. Other outcomes included rejection of a child born from rape with the
child stigmatized as ikenyendaro (bastard), with the risk of neglect or abuse.
One of the most confronting statistics was that the majority of pregnant GBV
victims were minors (under 18 years), but these girls were not given special
access to abortion in the 2012 review.
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A dramatic amplification of the ongoing stigma surrounding rape and abortion
was that in the two years following the 2012 reform, there was only one
abortion as a result of rape (Hodoglugil et al., 2017: 89). Cultural and legal
barriers to accessing safe abortions, without stigma or discrimination,
particularly for young women, in the years following the 2012 review and
reform, were immense. Estimates were that about 22% of unwanted
pregnancies ended in abortion and following this, 40% of these abortions led
to complications needing medical treatment (newsdeeply, 2018).
This extract from an interview in 2013 exemplifies the enormous cultural
challenges women and girls faced in relation to their reproductive and human
rights. This young woman was 21 when interviewed and had been imprisoned
since she was 18 for having had an abortion; she had 4 more years to serve.
I used to stay with both my parents when I got impregnated by a 42 year old
married local leader, who was also a family friend. Out of fear of my dad who is
also a pastor, I arranged with the local leader to get me traditional medicine to
do an abortion. I got very sick though and on the way to the hospital, I was over
bleeding (sic) and my mum got to know from the doctor that I had aborted. After
the abortion I was directly handed over to the police and then to prison. My dad
urged me to keep it a secret to protect the local leader (Umuhoza et al., 2013: 52).

Religious Barriers
The Catholic Church in Rwanda maintains an unshakeable resistance to any
change in the abortion law. The church had built a strong political and religious
powerbase from their arrival in Rwanda in 1900 as the Missionaries of Africa,
better known as the ‘White Fathers’. They cemented a relationship with the
Rwandan monarchy and set about converting the population to Christianity.
Historically, both the Catholic and Protestant churches were much more than
religious centres—they set up schools, health centres, introduced crops, new
farming techniques and various new enterprises (Longman, 2001: 11-12). The
Catholic Church especially, was strongly interwoven into the political, social
and cultural fabric of Rwanda. This continued throughout the twentieth
century, despite the church’s record of complicity, allied with inaction, during
the genocide (Longman, 2001: 166-169). The Catholic Church continues to
own and operate about 30% of health facilities at the community level,
working in conjunction with Government owned health facilities. The church

49

has been the ideological force disseminating information, as well as controlling
access to reproductive services (Santoshini, 2019:11-12). It was the most
vocal opponent to any change in the abortion law, although the Rwandan
Anglicans and Seventh Day Adventists held similar views. Changes in the
abortion law also ran counter to the strong religious beliefs of some health
care providers, exemplified by a retired nurse from the Nyarugenge District ,
who maintained that the women who induced an abortion should confess
before the congregation before they could be reintegrated into the church, so
they might fully grasp the gravity of their sin, ‘otherwise, women will carry out
abortions over and over again, bearing in mind that the Church will absolve
their sin’ (The New Times, 2015).
The Catholic Church continued to dictate health and reproductive services well
into the 21st century, however the momentum for change has been gathering
force domestically and internationally and culminated in the initial review of
2012. Lockstep with the Church’s resistance to contraception and abortion,
Rwandan men did not support family planning, as witnessed by responses to
a 2011 Government proposal that 700,000 men have vasectomies. Some men
conceded that family planning was a good thing, but it was women’s
responsibility, and a vasectomy was like “castrating yourself” (Jessee, 2020:
236).

In

response

to

the

2012

amendments,

Catholic

Bishop

Smaragde Mbonyintege, Bishop of Kabgayi (40km southwest of Kigali)
condemned the revision as “a shame upon the country” and that “anytime you
kill a baby in its mother’s womb is always killing a person” (Jessee, 2020: 237).
The Church flexed its power by calling for a referendum on the revised 2012
law, calculating that in a state where over 90% or people identified as Catholic,
there was a good chance to condemn abortion as murder. The government
however called the Church’s bluff, and there was no referendum. An ongoing
yet uneasy interdependency has continued between the Catholic Church and
the government.
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2018 Abortion Reform and Responses
Ongoing international and domestic advocacy forced the Rwandan
government in October 2018 to again change the persisting onerous and
punitive conditions required to procure a legal abortion. The Catholic
hierarchy responded with a message to the faithful that “the country was
threatened by a pandemic of promiscuity” (christian-99.com, 2019) and that
any acceptance of abortion risked divine punishment. The repressive 2012
reforms became unsustainable for the government which, while trumpeting
its gender equality credentials, was still jailing women and girls in a
fundamental abuse of their human rights. The changes came into effect in April
2019. This was a significant legal change for women’s reproductive rights in
this deeply conservative state. The new grounds for an abortion included if the
pregnant person was a child, the person had become pregnant as a result of
rape, forced marriage, or incest and the continued pregnancy put the mother
or fetus at risk (International Campaign for Women’s Right to Safe Abortion,
2019). Except in the case of risk to health of the mother or fetus, an abortion
could not be performed beyond twenty-two weeks.
These were long awaited changes to the penal code on abortion and the rights
of women and girls, but it is necessary to locate these changes within the
political context. On 4 April 2019, President Kagame pardoned 367 women
and girls who had been imprisoned for crimes of abortion, complicity in
abortion and infanticide. This pardon was no coincidence as it was just days
prior to the 25th anniversary of the 1994 genocide. Politically strategic as
always, this act praised the president as exercising “his prerogative of mercy”
and the press release stated that “The government has once again proven that
Rwanda is a cradle of women’s rights…and (the decision) reflects the rights
and freedoms of women and girls enshrined in the Constitution”
(Okiror,2019). Jessee’s interpretation of the pardons is that they were greeted
with accolades by pro-abortion advocates (Jessee, 2020: 238). My reading is
that it was more nuanced than that: the changes were welcomed, but it would
be a total misrepresentation to equate the granting of pardons with evidence
of fundamental gender equality for Rwandan women and girls. However, the
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tension between church and state continued to play out in the public forum,
though not always attributed to either entity.
According to Jessee (2020: 238) the Catholic hierarchy had been relatively
muted in their response to the pardons; however a savage indictment of the
church was unleashed in an opinion piece in the Kigali daily, The New Times,
several days after the pardons. It attacked the church’s role in the genocide
and a statement they had issued demanding the release of elderly and ill
perpetrators. These were perpetrators described in the press as refusing to
confess to their roles in the genocide and continuing to believe in a genocide
ideology. Both the pardons and the missive coincided with the 25th
anniversary. The opinion piece went on to attack the church’s resistance to all
female equity policies like legal abortion and “any other progressive policies”
with an endless flood of petitions (Ruhumuliza, 2019). One has to conclude
that, in a country with minimal press freedom, the journalist was expressing a
government sanctioned viewpoint. Ruhumuliza described the church as
experiencing an existential threat to its influence and a decline in the numbers
of the faithful, “Now it seems that the Catholic churches are drying up and
they’ve started to feel nostalgic” (Ruhumuliza, 2019). Further criticism of the
church was made by the Health Minister, Diane Gashumba, in June 2019, when
she complained that the catholic hierarchy was frustrating government efforts
to limit the number of births.
We can’t continue with a situation where health care professionals trained and paid
by the government can’t do their job because the church has prevented them…It’s
time our constitution was respected and our country’s laws enforced, since dialogue
with the church hasn’t worked (The New Times, 2019).

Some of the health care workers on the frontline are pragmatic without a
political agenda. Ndayambaje is a midwife and health services coordinator at
the new rural medical campus at the University of Global health Equity UGHE,
a private venture jointly funded by the Gates Foundation and Partners in
Health and opened in early 2019 by Paul Kagame. The midwife’s argument is
that Rwanda faces an outbreak of teen pregnancies, unsafe abortions, preterm
births, school dropouts and teen sex workers. In order to counter these
medical and social catastrophes, non-discriminatory access to sexual and
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reproductive health services should be top priority (Ndayabaje, 2020). The
midwife is yet to find majority support culturally and politically.
The Rwandan feminist group SPECTRA wanted Kagame to lift the ban on
abortions totally, and it expressed its frustration that although more than 50%
of politicians were women this did not indicate their support for the right of
women and girls to decriminalized abortions. The government appeared to be
distancing itself from the Catholic Church, but this cannot be read as a
liberalization of reproductive rights. The Minister for Gender and Family
Promotion was quick to allay cultural and religious fears that some women
would abuse the reforms of 2018, by restating that abortion was still illegal
and was still a crime. The inadequacy of the reforms, as they related to girls
under eighteen, required that they be accompanied by a parent if they sought
an abortion following rape. This was a severe limitation if the pregnancy had
resulted from a rape by a family member, a neighbor, or family friend. Some
lawmakers argued that excluding parents was a denial of parental rights, and
that some young women would use abortion as a means of birth control. This
position was supported by female politician, Euthalie Nyirabega, and was
backed by some health workers who were concerned that illegal abortions
“could slip through the system” (Rwirahira, 2018).
Women and girls still languished in jail for abortion related crimes, even
following the pardoning of 367 inmates on 4 April 2019, and even though
Kagame pardoned another 52 young women on 11 October 2019. Ironically,
this second lot of pardons took place on the International Day of the Girl Child
(11 October) and the statement issued from the Cabinet meeting read that
Kagame was, “exercising his power of mercy to give people another chance”,
while the tone from the Justice Minister, Johnston Busingye, was more punitive
stating that the President found it “fitting to give these convicts another
chance” (Journal du Cameroun, APA News 12 October 2019). Neither
statement indicates recognition of gender equality policy in action, nor the
reproductive and human rights of Rwandan women and girls.
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Conclusion
Non-discriminatory access to abortion still deeply divides Rwanda. There are
divisions between the Catholic Church and Kagame and some of his Ministers;
between some Government Ministers; between Rwandan feminists and the
Government; and between poorly informed, conservative and frequently
religious, healthcare workers and would be clients. Domestic and international
activists and advocates continue to push for the decriminalization of abortion
so no woman will be jailed for exercising her reproductive rights. Activists and
advocates have delivered legislative change in 2012 and 2018, but the cultural,
political and religious pushback is strong.
Rwandan President Paul Kagame maintains a delicate balancing act between
the state’s reliance on international aid, international approval for gender
equality policies, the ratification of treaties on women’s non-discriminatory
reproductive rights and cultural, political and religious resistance. It is deeply
disturbing that access to ‘illegal’ abortion remains a crime and that women and
girls are dependent on a presidential ‘act of mercy’ to be pardoned for their
crimes. This makes a mockery of Kagame’s internationally lauded gender
equality policies. One estimate is that up to 24,000 women and girls need
emergency medical treatment annually from unsafe abortions, and those
needing help are mostly young, rural and poor (Ipas 2019; Rwanda FP2020).
It continues to be young, poor, rural women and girls who do not benefit from
the façade of gender equality (Berry, 2014:1-8; Burnet, 2012).
There are sporadic public outbreaks of ideological division, often in the
government friendly press, with Kagame attacking the Catholic Church for its
role in the genocide and its resistance to legal abortion (Ruhumuliza, 2019).
The most recent foray, via the Kigali based New Times, argued for the removal
of restrictions on contraceptives for teenagers. The President plays a
duplicitous ‘double game’, one that is critical of the religious opposition to
contraception and contraceptive information for teenagers, yet his
government expresses a fear that sexually active teenagers will be
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psychologically damaged and should be held accountable for unwanted
pregnancies (Bishumba, 2020).
The other major problem is the patriarchal Rwandan male. There remains a
huge resistance to women’s sexual and reproductive rights on this front, as
seen by the response to the proposed vasectomy campaign and social attitudes
to GBV. The patriarchy and the Catholic Church are powerful allies, and they
are joint enemies of fundamental gender equality in the form of universal
access to sexual and reproductive health for women and girls. At the end of
this chapter on abortion and the right to a safe abortion, I feel I should quote
Valerie Hudson, Professor of International Affairs, from a letter to the New
York Times entitled ‘Gender isn’t just a human interest sideshow to high
politics’, which she had written in anticipation of the 25th anniversary of the
UN Conference for Women in Beijing: “The fate of nations is tied to the status
of women … [and] the law of the first political order is this: What you do to
your women, you do to your nation” (NYT, March 6 2020).
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Chapter Four: Sexual and Reproductive Health
This chapter explores the sexual and reproductive health services available to
women and girls in Rwanda. It focuses on accessibility and the obstacles to
access. It maps the changes in sexual and reproductive health from
independence, pre genocide and post genocide to the present day. Issues
addressed are contraception, sexually transmitted diseases, prevalence and
incidence of HIV, resistance to change and the forces driving change. These are
complex issues that continue to this day to be highly contentious in this
religious and patriarchal state. Family planning was always a patriarchal affair,
even prior to the German and Belgian rule of the late nineteenth century and
the full scale conversion to Catholicism beginning with the Tutsi kings and
extending to every village and villager. Women were defined as mothers and
carers in accordance with traditional gender norms, and their key role was to
bear as many children as possible (Jessee, 2020: 221).
There is general agreement among academics who explore gender equality in
Rwanda, that female roles were submissive and subservient, and although
Jessee agrees with these assessments, she suggests that in family planning
practices, women had a little more agency than is generally acknowledged
(Jessee, 2020: 221-223). This might however be an overly optimistic reading
of the evidence available and not reflective of more widespread practices or
norms. The issues involved in sexual and reproductive health are indeed
complex, and alliances and collaborations shift and change between
stakeholders such as church and state, conservatives and progressives,
women and men. The battlefronts are cultural, political, economic and
religious, and the political context is both domestic and international. The
stakes are high, as non-discriminatory access to sexual and reproductive
health services for women and girls in Rwanda would mean a fundamental
restructuring of the Rwandan state.
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Family Planning Pre-Genocide
Rwanda’s first family planning program offering modern contraception, to
married couples only, was set up in independence year, 1962. The average
family had 7.7 children per couple according to the first fertility survey of 1970
(Solo, 2008: 10). A five-year plan (1977-1981) included family planning goals,
in recognition that overpopulation was an enormous economic problem in this
tiny rural state. In 1981, a national office of population was set up to
implement population programs and began the integration of family planning
into all health services on offer. However, the sexual and reproductive health
services on offer were being made in the cultural context of a profound gender
inequality and ran counter to the religious and political interests of the
Catholic Church. The take-up of contraceptive methods, outside of abstinence
and ‘natural methods’ stipulated by the Catholic Church, was minimal and
ineffective. Proof of this contraceptive failure was that the size of the average
Rwandan family increased to 8.5 in the early 1980s. To counter this, a local
affiliate of International Planned Parenthood was invited into Rwanda by
President Habyarimana to optimize contraceptive take-up in the mid 1980s
(Solo, 2008: 10).
Kayibanda and Habyariana, the first two leaders of the newly independent
Rwanda, were however both devout Catholics, and tried to adhere to their
church’s dictates on family planning. President Habyarimana tried to balance
the dictates of the church against overpopulation, economic stagnation, poor
farming methods and poverty by making a bold step to allow pharmacies to
stock condoms and encouraging couples to use other methods to restrict the
number of children to four. The result was a backlash from within his own
party and from the Catholic Church, with raids on pharmacies by vigilante
mobs and the destruction of condom stocks (Jessee, 2020: 231). The Catholic
Church attacked Habyarimana as a corrupt and discriminatory ethnic force,
resulting in the president backing down and giving in to the power of the
church. The national population office in 1990 did however attempt to
implement family planning goals of reducing the total fertility rate (TFR) from
8.6 children to 4 by increasing the use of contraceptives from 2% to 48% by
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the year 2000 (Solo, 2008: 10). This shift was against a political background of
the Rwandan Patriotic Front incursion and the start of the civil war in 1990.
There was also some success with the implementation of these goals at the
individual family level with the recognition that big families were
unsustainable economically, in spite of powerful traditional norms. Midway
through the civil war, the average family size was 6.2, with a contraceptive
take-up rate of 13%, and this was despite the conflict and the ongoing and
vigorous opposition from the Catholic Church (Solo, 2008: 10). Change,
although incrementally slow, in relation to contraception and family
sustainability, was a challenge to cultural and religious tradition.

Contraception Post Genocide
Post genocide, Paul Kagame’s government had the herculean task of rebuilding
a shattered country, where upwards of 800,000 had been killed and
infrastructure was decimated. A reassessment of family planning policy was
implemented along with policies of social, political and economic
reconstruction. In 2000 a demographic and health survey recorded average
family size as 5.8 children, but even then the contraceptive take up rate was as
low as 4%. Kagame was however to build and shape his domestic and
international reputation on gender equality, as foundational to economic,
social and political growth in Vision 2020 (2003).
Julie Solo’s research covered the growth of health care centres as they tackled
the once taboo subject of family planning and assessed the delivery of services
and client inhibition. The reasoning was that offering wide ranging services
and options would create demand and help break down cultural and religious
barriers. Health care clients she interviewed lamented their economic poverty
and the burden of raising even one child (Solo, 2008: 24-27). The confidential
services for women meant that husbands did not need to know that their wives
were using long-term contraceptives like Depo-Provera. This was a challenge
to understandings of Rwandan masculinity that were built around fertility and
big families. While contraception use presented a challenge to religious dogma
that defined contraception as a sin, married women felt more secure and
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distanced from marital and religious disapproval and persecution, especially
when anonymity was assured.
There was a slow incremental climb in contraceptive use from 2005, following
a dramatic fall in usage in 2000. Injectables became the most frequently used
contraceptives – 5% as against 2% for the birth control pill—but both were
still very low figures. (Solo 2008: 7). There was a much higher usage in urban
areas than in rural (21% as against 9%) and higher usage among more
educated women than those with little or no education (29% as against 6%).
Given the urban/rural divide, these statistics are not surprising. Implants
ranked second over a four-year period from 2004 to 2008; the pill ranked third
and condoms and IUDs at the bottom of uptakes (FP2020: 2018-2019).
Percentage wise, the results were: injectables 51%; birth control pill 16.9%;
condoms 7.9%; IUDs 2.5%. Sterilisation for women stood at 2.5% while for
men it was just 0.4%. It is important to counter Solo’s more optimistic, though
not uncritical, research into family planning as there were reasons other than
educational ones that accounted for the much lower uptake among rural
women. Rural women, if victims of abuse, were reluctant to attend health
clinics seeking family planning help and support because of shame, traditional
gender inequality and poverty. Many suffered physical and psychological
abuse, and had poor awareness that marital rape was a crime. These factors
led to fewer married rural women seeking reproductive health services
(Umubyeyi, 2016: 7-8). The government should be given praise for the
increase in contraceptive prevalence and the decrease in the state’s fertility
rate from 6.1 children per woman to 3.9. This was the result of profound policy
changes that aligned poverty, economic growth, fertility and unsustainably
large families. However, family planning policy was designed for married
women , and was never intended for single women and girls.

Resistance: The Government and the Church versus Single Women and
Feminists

Under the Kagame government the failure to delivering sexual and
reproductive services to young unmarried women has continued to be one
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driven by politically conservative moral and religious forces. The reality,
according to Rwandan feminist Chantal Umuhoza (2019), is that most young
Rwandan women are sexually active by age fifteen, but they are provided with
little information and no access to sexual and reproductive services. There was
an embargo on providing what could be life-saving information for teenagers
under the age of majority (18 years) with information that could prevent
unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. This was not just
about affordability, it was also due to legal and cultural restrictions, aligned
with the discrimination and stigmatisation that young women encountered at
health facilities (Umuhoza, 2019). In the four years from February 2016 to
February 2020 there was a surge in teen pregnancies as indicated by the
78,000 babies born to teenage mothers (Bishumba, 2020). These statistics
represent a major political and cultural failure for the new generation of
Rwandan women. Rather than representing fundamental gender equality the
high number of teenage mothers should be placed within the context of
Rwandan social attitudes, especially those of Rwandan men. In a patriarchal
society where mean are overwhelmingly unwilling to take any responsibility
for contraception it is worth reprising the male response to a 2011
government proposal that 700,000 men undergo vasectomies, at government
expense. “Family planning for men?.. don’t you think it’s like castrating
yourself? Only women should adopt family planning”(Jessee, 2020: 236).
The Rwandan state’s failure to provide sexual and reproductive health
services for young women is noted in the current government’s strategic
health plan for 2018-2024. However, the focus is on delivering information,
rather than access, to a full range of sexual and reproductive services
(Umuhoza, 2019). This amounts to a political, religious and cultural denial of
the sexual realities of Rwandan youth. The plan references “age appropriate
contraception”, and proposed sex education does not include contraceptives
at youth friendly health centres. The reality of adolescent sexual behaviour and
needs sits at the margins of Rwanda’s health policy; these are in many
instances admirable policies designed to safeguard women’s health, but for
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more than two decades the focus and funding has been on maternal, newborn
and child health.
Umuhoza and SPECTRA are powerful advocates for the implementation of
comprehensive sex education and the full access to sexual and reproductive
services, without any age limitation. Among advocates, there is a determined
push to embrace the reality that many Rwandan girls are sexually active in
their teens and that the legal age of majority should be reduced from eighteen
to fifteen. Further advocates of reform argue for amendments to the law that
makes it a legal requirement that a health worker to inform the parent or
guardian if a minor seeks sexual or reproductive services. According to the
Bishumba article (2020), a draft bill, yet to be enacted, would repeal this
requirement, and allow a fifteen year old to access contraceptives, without
informing their parents or guardian.
Paul Kagame’s response to these moves has been cautious, possibly in
consideration of attempting to unify sharply divided cultural, political and
religious entities. He has expressed a fear that teenage sexual behaviour could
be psychologically damaging and that Rwandan youth are being sent the
wrong message: “ We should fight teenage pregnancy…and work on reducing
it to a minimum as we also hold the people involved accountable” (Bishumba,
2020). Kagame’s collaboration with the Catholic Church is based on the fact
that it currently funds and controls about a third of the country’s hospitals and
clinics, and the state is reliant on the Church to deliver on promised family
planning policy. Yet the obstacles within Catholic healthcare remain immense.
Jessee cites a nurse at a Catholic clinic who said she received requests on
family planning only from married couples, explaining that “if you don’t have
a husband, what do you need family planning for?...You have nothing to plan”
(2020: 238). SPECTRA and the Health Development Initiative (HDI) are allies
and advocates for legal changes to empower Rwandan youth, and although
both concede that the conversation has stalled, the combined push is for the
government, conservatives and religious to “accept the reality of today’s
teenager” (Bishumba, 2020). One rather more pragmatic member of Statistics
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of Social Protection was quoted in the Bishumba article: “Whether you like it
or not, and regardless of the effort that you put in abstinence, teenagers will
still have sex”. The statistician went on to point out that in one of Rwanda’s
district, births to teenagers was above the national population growth rate
(Bishumba, 2020). In the last 4 years, (2016-2020) 78,000 teen births have
been reported in Rwanda; that is a 200% increase in the last ten years
(Ndayambaje, 2020), yet responses from state health services are couched in
bureaucratic caution about an ongoing discussion gathering different points of
view, “to come up with the best solution for our population”: (Bishumba 2020).

HIV Prevalence and Incidence
Rwanda has been the only country in sub-Saharan Africa to have successfully
implemented voluntary testing and counseling of heterosexual couples to
reduce viral HIV transmission (Ingabire et al., 2019: 558). The statistics were
collated from the first national survey measuring Rwanda’s HIV response
(conducted from October 2018 to March 2019) and make interesting reading.
Eleven thousand households were targeted and approximately 210,200 adults
(15-64 years) were found to be living with HIV (RPHIA, 2019). This equated to
over 17,000 women and over 14,000 men interviewed and tested for HIV.
Prevalence was higher among women than men in the same age category,
registering as 3.7% against 2.2% for males. Stable heterosexual relationships
were estimated to have the highest rate of HIV transmission at 65% percent
(RPHIA, 2019). Prevalence among young Rwandan adolescents, aged 10-14,
corresponded to nearly 6,000 young people living with HIV (RPHIA, 2019).
Among young people aged 20-24, HIV prevalence was higher among young
women than among young men, with women registering 1.8% as compared to
0.6% for men, and even while young women recorded triple the rate of young
men living with HIV, these percentages are very low.
As Karuhanga (2019) notes the absence of drugs in sub-Saharan Africa was
already a problem in treating HIV/AIDS, but “…in Rwanda it was even worse
because there was even a Genocide and (spreading) HIV was used as a weapon
of war …”. In the area of HIV mitigation President Kagame deserves praise. In
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the last twenty-five years the prevalence of those living with HIV in the general
Rwandan population has fallen from 25-30% to less than 10%. While on the
surface this would appear to herald success, in a country where 60% of the
population is aged under twenty five, and where culture and tradition dictate
that young Rwandans abstain from sex until marriage, this could become a
major health issue, unless addressed at the highest political level, irrespective
of religious pressure (Schwandt et al., 2018: 6-9).

On the Periphery
Paul Kagame and his cabinet will need to exercise strong political will,
challenge tradition and resist the religious organisations if they are to deliver
non-discriminatory access to healthcare for all Rwandans, as promised in the
Constitution. Bolstering the cabinet’s position, the UNAIDS report of 2017
committed to eliminating gender inequalities, ending all forms of violence
against women and girls, and accessing key populations living with HIV, but
these still remain major issues. Girls and women, and children under 14,
remained vulnerable to HIV infection due to a combination of factors like
gender norms and cultural attitudes to sex and sexuality. This in turn limited
access to information and education and kept women and girls economically
vulnerable and dependent. HIV testing services are available in 99% of health
clinics, but adolescent girls and young adults, who represent the biggest
proportion of the Rwandan population, have limited access to testing services
(unaids.org 2017).
Also on the periphery in accessing HIV services, are female sex workers with
an estimated prevalence rate of 51%, which is 17 times greater than the rest
of the population (Ingabire et al., 2019: 564-566). Findings in the survey found
that the proportion of female sex workers were living with HIV (over 50%),
had barely shifted from previous studies. More alarming was that one in four
female sex workers who had reported being HIV negative in previous studies,
reported as being HIV positive in this study, which attests to a dramatic failure
rate in treatment compared to the general population, and to the continuation
of HIV transmission in Rwanda. Another key population group with an
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equivalent vulnerability to female sex workers (FSW), is men who have sex
with men (MSM). Preliminary results of a 2018 survey in Kigali of MSM
estimates a population of approximately eight and a half thousand, with the
HIV prevalence estimated to be 9.2%. Just as with female sex workers these
men suffer similar stigma and discrimination.

Conclusion
German and Belgian colonialism and the Catholic Church reinforced Rwanda’s
traditional norms of the large and expanding family as a sign of wealth,
prestige and pride. Erin Jessee’s research into selected oral traditions
(ibitekerezo) has revealed that there was, in pre-Christian, pre-colonial times,
enormous pride and social pressure for Rwandan families to produce as many
children as possible (Jessee, 2020). As mentioned previously, President
Habyarimana attempted a bold economic and cultural move to break with
tradition, and encouraged married couples to use condoms. The backlash from
the Catholic Church, his own party and a conservative population quickly
torpedoed that initiative. Other obstacles collectively reinforcing religious
roadblocks are Rwandan male intransigence, rural isolation, human resources
in health clinics—high turnover, low skill base, low levels of family planning
funding, the majority of which still comes from international donors—and
President Kagame himself who has negotiated cautiously between the more
conservative rump of his government, the religious organisations and the
electorate.
The issue of sexual health is more complex than it might initially appear, and
it can be hard to gauge whether we are witnessing gradual progress, political
timidity, a strategic buying of time as a means to overcome fierce opposition,
or an amalgam of all three. Kagame appears to be playing a cautious game,
although in 2019, he welcomed the establishment of a more liberal leaning
rural medical campus, privately funded by the Gates Foundation and Partners
in Health (Bizumungu, 2019). Whether this indicates a gradual liberalizing of
the government’s position on sexual and reproductive health is not entirely
apparent.
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On another front, in a country where a free press is anathema, the conservative
daily and de facto government paper The New Times, has published articles
written by a new generation of young Rwandan feminists, advocating access
to and use of sexual and reproductive services for young unmarried teens
(Bishumba, 2020). The Health Development Initiative (HDI) and international
health and reproductive bodies are advocating similar changes to those
advanced by young Rwandan feminists like Chantal Umuhoza. They use the
language of gender equality in policy initiatives like Vision 2020 as leverage
for change.
Paul Kagame has built his domestic and international reputation for stability
and economic growth on gender equality, but his government’s poor record on
human rights makes him a target for progressive academics, NGOs, politicians
and other governments. They are vociferous in their criticism of his repressive
regime, and what this means, in reality for the reproductive rights of women
and girls. As Onditi and Odera observe the ability to access sexual and
reproductive services, whether one is married or single, has not followed on
from the highly touted gender equality legislation (Onditi and Odera, 2017:
157-158; 163).
The surge in teen pregnancies is indicative of the severely restricted access to
reproductive services. It is the young, rural and poor women and girls who
have not reaped the benefits of gender equality legislation, especially where it
applies to sexual and reproductive health (Mann & Berry, 2016). Burnet
(2012) describes this as the façade of gender equality. Arendt unpacks the
political quota system, arguing it gives no true indication of women’s
empowerment and their ability to shape policy. Rwanda is ranked low in an
assessment of democratic flow on from its gender quotas—the flipside of this
is its high ranking for the number of women as a proportion of the legislature.
The presence of women has not however translated into the empowerment of
women, and this is especially the case for young, poor, rural women and their
access to sexual and reproductive services (Arendt, 2018:). So it is essential to
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keep questioning publicly the broader political, cultural and religious context
in which gender equality policies have been shaped by the Kagame
government, a context where young women especially are the losers.

Conclusion: Gender-Based Violence, Abortion, Sexual and
Reproductive Health in Rwanda: Myth and Reality
Following the Rwandan genocide women comprised almost 70% of the
remaining population. The vacuum left by the massacre of hundreds of
thousands of Rwandan men, meant it was essential and politically strategic for
women to assume more publicly visible roles in a conservative patriarchal
state, if society was not to collapse totally. But the reality was that Paul Kagame
and the Rwandan Patriotic Front have dictated the terms of women’s
engagement. The state needed stability and Paul Kagame and the RPF
delivered. Despite some international concern over how stability was achieved
and the denial of human rights, political stability was the key to attracting
international aid and economic regeneration. The repression of gendered,
ethnic and civil rights was deemed justified to maintain stability in the creation
of a new Rwanda. No matter how much international and domestic praise is
lavished upon Kagame for addressing gender equality after 1994, the rates of
gender-based violence, abortion and failure to provide appropriate access to
sexual and reproductive services for women are evidence that the gender
mainstreaming so beloved by international donors is not actually the reality of
the situation for women in Rwanda. Rather than being peripheral issues for
Rwandan women, this thesis has argued gender-based violence, abortion and
sexual and reproductive health services form the basis of gender equality.
President Paul Kagame legislated policies of gender equality as being crucial
to the reconstruction of the new Rwanda, post genocide. These policies have
been acclaimed internationally and domestically. Internationally, the
existence of impressive gender equality legislation is extremely good politics
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for a state dependent on foreign aid, and for leveraging genocide guilt
following the global abandonment of any responsibility to intervene and stop
the killing. The harsh truth is that freedom from gender-based violence, access
to safe abortions and access to sexual and reproductive health services is not
the current reality for all Rwandan women and girls. This is despite the fact
that the state has ratified and is signatory to a number of international
instruments and United Nations declared basic human rights for women and
girls (Kane, 2015: 4-11; CEDAW, 2009: 5). The real barriers to gender equality
continue to be cultural, religious, political and judicial, and women and girls
are the targets and the victims. Not infrequently women and girls are held
responsible for GBV, not the male perpetrators, as one of the prevailing views
is that women and girls have brought this violence on themselves through
their disruption of traditional gender norms (Mannell, 2014).
Widespread gender equality is far from the reality, despite gender
mainstreaming policies being touted and lauded as critical for economic
growth and development (Hansen, 2017:11-13). GBV remains widespread and
ongoing in spite of a criminal code that directly targets gender-based violence
and a constitution that guarantees protection from cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment (Rwanda VNR Report, 2019: 76-78). Reasons for this are
complex, inter-related and interdependent. Gender policies have also been
imposed from the top down—they have not evolved from a grass roots
agitation for cultural, political and religious change. It could be described as a
President leading and controlling a women’s movement that maintains a
façade of gender equality while jailing women and girls for having an abortion
or assisting in an abortion. For these ‘crimes’, prison sentences range from five
to fifteen years and the deeply conservative judicial system required, until
very recently, court approval for a ‘legal’ abortion and the approval of two
doctors (Santoshini, 2019: 8-14).
With respect to access to abortion, young women remain the most vulnerable
group, legally, medically and culturally. Widespread sexual violence was a
critical factor resulting in unwanted pregnancies, along with highly restricted
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access to information on sexual health and contraception. Shame, stigma, guilt
and ostracism remain as factors that prevent women and girls seeking an
abortion. For generations, the most accurate reading of the laws on abortion
has to be that women and girls were held to be the guilty parties. They were
the perpetrators. Men and boys were not held accountable, whether abortion
was a result of rape, conjugal rape or incest. Although there were changes to
the penal code in 2012 and 2018, as late as April 2019, and to coincide with
the 25th anniversary of the genocide, Kagame was praised for exercising his
“perogative of mercy” by pardoning 367 women and girls for abortion,
complicity in abortion and infanticide. The government press release
congratulating the President on his act of mercy read: “The government has
once again proven that Rwanda is a cradle of women’s rights…and (the
decision) reflects the rights and freedoms of women and girls enshrined in the
Constitution” (Okiror, 2019). Kagame pardoned another 52 young women in
late October 2019, stating that these women were being given “another
chance” (Okiror, 2019). The Justice Minister was more punitive in tone, stating
that “it was fitting to give these convicts another chance” (APA News Agence de
Presse Africaine, 2019). While releasing women from jail for for having
abortions is overdue, the portrayal of such gestures as ‘mercy’ are clear proof
of the current depth of real gender inequality in Rwanda.
Another profound indication of gender inequality was the jailing of two
opposition female politicians for political dissent. These two women were
voicing alternative political viewpoints that should constitute part of robust
political debate, however in an authoritarian and repressive state like Rwanda,
the assumption was that in return for political elevation, women would be
‘malleable’ enough not to deviate from accepted government ideology (Hogg,
2009: 4-6). Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza spent eight years of a fifteen-year
sentence in jail on charges of terrorism and threatening national security
(Aljazeera, 2018: New York Times, 2018). Diane Shima Rwigara ran as a
presidential candidate against Paul Kagame in 2015 and was publicly critical
of his gender equality policies. She was charged and convicted of tax evasion
and forgery. Both women were finally released from prison and charges
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against Rwigara were dropped by the High Court, but Kagame warned both
women they would find themselves back in jail, if they were not careful (Burke,
2018). This was a salutatory lesson to women who dared voice opposition to
the political agenda of the RPF dominated government. The jailing of these two
politicians sent an unambiguous message to all women and girls.
Individual female politicians have not been entirely silent or complicit in
relation to gender-based violence, abortion and sexual and reproductive
health, however their criticisms have been aimed at the religious, not the
government policies. Health Minister, Diane Gashumba has attacked the role
of the Catholic Church on family planning and their adherence to “allowing
only natural contraception” (christian-99. com 2019), yet the rate of real
change to the fundamental rights of women and girls has been glacial. The
Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion has acknowledged the national
extent of gender-based violence (MIGEPROF, 2011: 7-8), finding that violence
against women and girls reflected and reinforced a culturally based gender
inequality. A follow-up study by the Rwanda Civil Society Platform found that
GBV continued to be a serious problem, and that male abusers did not
acknowledge that abuse was a crime or a misdemeanor (RCSP, 2018: 33-35).
The report observed that gender equality was equated with feminism, which
is seen as western notion, and which “does not bear good fruit” (RCSP, 2018:
39). In spite of the sensitization initiatives being implemented at village level,
the outcomes present a pessimistic picture of changing traditional norms.
These include the adherence to the traditional role of masculinity and the
consequent shame some men feel in supporting or attending gender equality
programs (RCSP, 2018: 33). Added to this is reluctance by victims to report
assaults due to shame, stigma and family pressure and the silent toleration of
gender-based violence by women, as well as men. Some of the underlying
reasons are avoidance of family conflicts, preservation of the marriage and
lack of the confidence, without village support, to name the perpetrator (RCSP,
2018: 33).
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Paul Kagame has made well-publicized and strategically commendable efforts
to mainstream gender equality policies in the reconstruction of Rwanda, post
genocide. But it is gross political hypocrisy to embrace and legislate gender
equality, while at the same time permitting a high tolerance of gender-based
violence, the jailing of women and girls for what are deemed illegal abortions,
and prohibiting access to reproductive health services, especially for young
women and girls. Women awarded the seats or positions reserved for women
do so having been vetted by the RPF; their allegiance is meant to be to the RPF,
and not to the ordinary Rwandans in the electorate (Thomson, 2018: 189). The
president is a brilliant political strategist, who brooks little opposition or
criticism and condemns international criticism of his ongoing violation of
human rights as evidence of the ‘old colonialism’. Domestic opposition to his
rule is contained or eliminated by fear, resignation, imprisonment and at times
assassination.
After the horrors of the 1994 genocide, the Kagame government has brought
political stability to the state, but this stability has been accompanied by a
political climate in which dissent is not possible. Political stability has come at
a great price for women and girls, with the ongoing repression of their
fundamental rights. Transitioning to a state with real non-discriminatory
gender equality, embracing fundamental rights for all Rwandan women and
girls, may lie in a generational change propelled by the sixty percent of the
population, now under twenty -four years of age.
Susan Thomson is one of the strongest critics of the Kagame regime and its
stability and longevity as an authoritarian state. She also questions the
ongoing intimacy between the Catholic church and state, reflecting a similar
pattern, pre and post genocide, with the church continuing to tolerate
economic inequality, social exclusion and ethnic violence (Thomson, 2013: 6275; Thomson, 2018: 252-253). Thompson argues this intimacy between
church and state, a government intolerant of dissent, a fearful population with
an older demographic shattered by genocide, and clinging to traditional
gender inequality, will never translate into an open non- discriminatory access
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to reproductive services (Beresford et al., 2018). The Catholic Church is also
unlikely to relinquish voluntarily its moral grip on the sex lives of Rwandans,
while President Kagame is unlikely to sever government ties with the Church,
as the state is to a large part dependent on its provision of health care. In
assessing the evidence on the cultural, political, and religious constraints and
obstacles to accessing sexual and reproductive health care, especially for
single women and adolescent girls, it will be the current bold and upcoming
generations of Rwandan feminists, who will be the main determinants of
change for young Rwandans, both male and female. If it can occur, such a
change must be generational, emboldened, and fearless enough to challenge
the political power of Kagame RPF state, the cultural power of Rwandan
patriarchy and the religious conservatism of the Catholic Church.
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